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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellant Asael Farr 
& Sons Company, will be referred to herein as "Farr"; appellee Truck Insurance 
Exchange will be referred to herein as "TIE" or at times "Farmers"; appellee Andrew L. 
Reed will be referred to herein as "Reed"; appellee Trustco, Inc. will be referred to herein 
as "Trustco"; appellee Safeco Insurance Company will be referred to herein as "Safeco"; 
appellee American States Insurance Co. will be referred to herein as "American States"; 
appellee Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection And Insurance Co. will be referred to herein as 
"Hartford"; appellee Stephen D. Kirchen will be referred to herein as "Kirchen"; 
appellees Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. and Central Bonds And Insurance 
Company, Incorporated will collectively be referred to herein as "Central Bonds"; 
appellee Auto-Owners Insurance Company will be referred to herein as "Auto Owners"; 
appellees Blackburn Jones Company and E. Kent Jones will be referred to herein as 
"Jones"; appellees Trinty Universal Insurance Company Of Kansas, Inc. and Trinity 
Universal Insurance Co. shall collectively be referred to herein as "Trinity"; and appellee 
Unitrin Property & Casualty Insurance Group will be referred to herein as "Unitrin". 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-30). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
DETERMINED THAT FARR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
1 
JUDGMENT, AND APPELLEES WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: Summary judgment shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah R. 
Civ. P. Facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom shall be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, \2, 116 P.3d 263. 
When a trial court's rulings are based upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law, where a correct one would have produced a different result, the party adversely 
affected is entitled to have the error rectified in a proper adjudication under a correct 
principal of law. Reedv. Avery, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 
857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912). 
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Third Amended Complaint For Declaratory Relief (R. 292-311); Motion For 
Leave To File And Serve Fourth Amended Complaint and responsive memoranda (R. 
585); The parties various Motions For Summary Judgment and responsive memoranda 
(R. 686-3069 and 3088-3373); Transcript-Motions Hearings-May 4, 2007 and May 7, 
2007 (R. 3534); and Trial Court's Ruling (3497-3515). 
RULES, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO 
THE APPEAL 
2 
The following cited rules, statutes and regulations are determinative of the appeal 
or of central importance to the appeal and are set forth in the Addendum to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301 (84)(a) and (b)(i) 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301 (86)(a)(i) 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-102 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-402 (2)(a)(ii) 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-405 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-303(3)(h) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) 
Rule 56(c) Utah R. Civ. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition Below 
This case deals with an ice cream inventory loss Farr suffered at its Salt Lake City 
ice cream freezer warehouse. The loss occurred shortly after Fair's prior Trinity and 
Unitrin insurance coverage had non-renewed, and during the binder period of new 
insurance coverage Farr had obtained to cover its inventory. 
Following the loss, Farr learned that its insurers claimed either there was no 
coverage, or only minimal amounts of coverage, for Fair's substantial losses. As a result, 
Farr brought suit against the insurance companies and insurance agents involved in the 
transaction. Fair's claims included breach of contract, negligence and breach of 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing and estoppel. 
Several depositions were taken and substantial discovery was completed. 
Following the depositions and discovery, each of the parties moved for summary 
3 
judgmeni I lir ina! mini denied Farr's motion for summary judgment and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. This appeal followed. 
The Parties 
1 Farr is a privately held corporation, incorporated in 1920, engaged in the 
business of manufacturing, wholesale dislnbiihiia, , d nn/iailina u*e cream piodm Is (Ii. 
2178 ai 
2. The Jones are licensed Utah resident insurance producers and agents, and 
duly authorized agents and representatives of Trii lilh « ai i :1 1 Ii liti ii i Ii i tl i.at c .apacity, ai i.d 
pi IOI U i I an 's insurance loss in this case, Jones provided insurance coverage for Farr. (R. 
2178 at^|2) 
3. Kirchen is a "I J'tal I licensed ii ISUI ance prodi ice it a i id agent 1: IC Iding pi operty, 
casi ialt> and life insurance licenses. (R. 2180 at ^|4) 
4. Central Bonds is a Utah licensed insurance agency for whom Kirchen was 
authorized to act as a proiliicei/ageiif loi "\nlu < hviu/is I.MI niMiianre < onipaih In cnsnl to 
do bi isiness in Utah). (R. 2180 at P) 
5. Reed is a licensed insurance producer/agent who hr-u> w 'Commercial 
Qualified Agent" designallui, j:,i\cBj11 h\ ia i tnins lusuiaiici" < \\t- • . en 
TIE is a member (R. 2180 at ^|6) 
6. TIE is a Farmers entity and a Utah licensed and qualified insurance 
company conducting insurance business in 1 • .,-
hereto was a di ily author ized insi irance producer/agent. (R. 2180 at Tf7) 
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7. Safeco and Safeco's parent insurance company, American States, are 
insurance companies licensed to conduct insurance business in Utah. (R. 2181 at ^ |9) 
8. Safeco/American have a December 31, 2000 reinsurance agreement with 
Hartford, under which Hartford reinsures the "equipment breakdown" coverage of 
Safeco's commercial insurance policies. (R. 2181 at^flO) 
9. Trustco is a Utah Corporation owned by Troy Granger ("Granger") and 
Greg Kingdon and is a Utah licensed insurance producer/agent. Granger and Trustco 
have producer/agent licenses for property, casualty, life and health lines of coverage. (R. 
2181 a t l l l ) 
Fair's Loss 
10. The litigation in the trial court arose from a loss ("Loss") which occurred 
on May 29, 2003, at Farr's "cold storage warehouse" in Salt Lake City, Utah. Farr alleges 
that an electric condenser fan motor accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an 
ammonia line, thereby releasing ammonia that contaminated all of Farr's ice cream 
inventory stored therein thereby rendering the same unmarketable and of no value. (R. 
666 at Tf4) 
11. Farr alleged that at the time of the loss the amount of damages it incurred 
was greater than $1.5 million dollars ($1,500,000.00). (R. 667 at 1J5) 
Status Of Insurance Coverage During Year Prior To The Loss 
12. Dexter Duane Farr ("Dexter Farr"), Farr's general manager and Chairman 
of Farr's Board of Directors (and the father of Farr employees Michael, Nathan and Darin 
Farr) was the authorized representative of Farr responsible for obtaining insurance 
5 
coverage for Farr including property damage and liability coverage for the period May 
14, 2002 through May 14, 2003 (the policy year prior to the Loss). When seeking 
insurance coverage, Dexter Farr generally met •" h'scussioi is w itl i ii ISI n a/nce agents 
concerning Fair's needs for commercial property and liability insurance. (R. 2183 at 
1fl6) 
13. Dexter Farr never had formal insui ai ice ti ainii i.g oi experience si ich as 
taking ii isi ii ai ice classes. (R. ZLOJ ai j^i 7) 
14. In working with commercial property and Ihbilitv msurance 
brokers/agents, Dexter Farr would piw . - is 
show ii:.. _. .... .-._ UL insurance in effect for the prior year; go over JL~ tilings Dcuei 
Farr felt should be covered and review property values: "If I had inventory that I knew 
went up. »! u increase. , . . Anil on tin1 '(KHpoluN I m JISHII ml limn HhHO in V'lHHNHl mi 
P«< l /t ii products in the warehouse due to the fact that these items that we were buying 
for resale came in small packages and cost a lot of money. I wanted to make sure it was 
covered ' (K. ..'.INI ;il )\\{l) 
15. During the year prior to the Loss that is the subject of this action, Farr had 
been insured h\ hmiK (through Jones), a subsidiary of I Jnitrin (referred to in the 
pleadings as linnm* rmpoi'ty & ('usually Insurant*,1 (inuip) \\i M'w M ]\b) 
16. iiic ImiiP policy provided Fan with commercial auto, commercial 
property (including equipment breakdown coverage) comprehensive crime, 
comprehensive general liability and inland niai nie » overage 11" M'w» ml f' I 
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17. By Notice of Non Renewal dated March 31, 2003, Trinity gave Fair notice 
that the Trinity policy would not be in effect after May 13, 2003 because Trinity had 
decided to no longer insure manufacturers and distributors of dairy products. Dexter Fan-
thereupon contacted Jones and talked to several other insurance producers/agents and 
solicited bids for their business. (R. 2184 at }^20) 
Andrew Reed And Farmers 
18. During the efforts to replace its insurance coverage, Reed met with Dexter 
Farr. (R. 669 at If 16) 
19. At that time Reed was providing workers compensation coverage for Farr, 
and was attempting to obtain all of Farr's insurance business. (R. 667 at 1J17; R. 2185 at 
1122) 
20. Farr has asserted that Reed represented himself to Dexter Farr as "a highly 
skilled, honest insurance agent capable of providing Farr with the insurance that was 
reasonably required and available to insure that all of Farr's significant insurable risks 
were covered." (R. 669 at ^20) 
21. Reed sought to secure the information he deemed necessary to submit a bid 
for placing Farr's expiring insurance coverage through TIE (Farmers). (R. 670 at TJ19) 
22. Reed was provided with all of the information he requested to allow him to 
attempt to place Farr's replacement coverage with TIE. (R. 670 at [^20) 
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23. Reed testified that he went through each of the particular coverages with 
Dexter Farr: "we discussed . . . line by line, just about every coverage on the bid spec1. 
Was it still appropriate, what changes have occurred?" (R. 670 at [^22) 
24. Reed testified that he told Dexter Farr that the bid specs prepared by Jones 
were inadequate in comparison to Farr's potential exposure to loss and that he would 
produce an appropriate bid. (R. 671 at ^ |24) 
25. Reed subsequently discovered that TIE/Farmers would not write the 
coverage for Farr that Reed requested. (R. 671 at [^25) 
26. Farmers purportedly expressed concern that two of the Farr buildings were 
too close together to satisfy its underwriting guidelines. (R. 671 at [^26) 
27. Reed had binding authority (from Farmers) sufficient to issue a binder to 
Farr, but Farmers, in this case, conditioned his binding authority on a process involving 
approval from Tim Taylor in TIE's underwriting department. (R. 671 at \21) 
28. Since Reed, as a "captive agent" for Farmers, was not able to place Farr's 
coverage with Farmers, he then became free to shop around with other insurers in an 
attempt to place the business. (R. 671 at J^28) 
29. Reed tried very hard to "control" the entire Farr account. He wanted to be 
the insurance broker for all of Farr's lines of coverage. (R. 672 at J^29) 
30. He did not allow other agents he talked with to meet with Fair regarding the 
Farr account, and in fact he is the only producer/agent that ever had any personal contact 
with Fan. (R. 672 at 1[30) 
l
"bid specs" are coverage amounts and areas of coverage an insurance agent uses to 
prepare an insurance quote. 
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31. Reed led Fan* to believe that Farr's bound coverage was placed with TIE 
for a short time by not telling Fan* about the rejection by TIE to provide Fan with 
coverage. (R. 672 at p 1) 
32. Reed testified that the typical TIE/Farmers policy has a default coverage 
limit for equipment breakdown coverage making the coverage limit applicable to 
equipment breakdown coverage (including spoilage claims) the same as the property 
coverage limits — in this case $7.8 million dollars. (R. 672 at ^32) 
33. Reed testified that he did not rely on the Trinity policy or base his decisions 
as to the appropriate levels of coverage on what was offered in the Trinity policy. (R. 670 
at p 3 ) 
Steve Kirchen And Central Bonds 
34. Sometime in March 2003, Reed contacted his business acquaintance 
Kirchen a producer/agent of Central Bonds, to determine if Kirchen would be able to 
place the Farr account. (R. 673 at [^34) 
35. Reed had a sense that he might have a problem placing the Farr coverage 
with TIE/Farmers. He asked Kirchen if he had a market (an insurance company) for it 
and Kirchen thought he might be able to place it. (R. 673 at ^35) 
36. In early to mid April, Kirchen learned, through a phone call from Reed, that 
Farmers had officially declined to write the business and that Reed was "looking for a 
home for i t" (R. 673 at 1J36) 
37. Reed met with Kirchen the next day to "go through the bid specs" he had. 
(R.673at1J37) 
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38. Reed and Kirchen met several other times, and Kirchen subsequently 
learned the kind of business which was run by Farr, the identity of other agencies who 
were quoting this business, loss history, etc. (R. 673 at €||22) 
39. Kirchen said that he would "go to market" and see if any of the companies 
with which he did business were interesting in writing the coverage. (R. 674 at <[[39) 
40. Kirchen contacted CNA, Allied and Auto Owners. (R. 674 at flO) 
41. CNA declined to write the business because of a "time issue" — meaning 
that CNA needed more time than was available to properly estimate the risks involved 
and to set pricing for those risks. (R. 674 at [^41) 
42. Allied declined to write the policy because of concerns about ammonia 
losses, spoilage, and property values — among other things. (R. 674 at ^ |42) 
43. Central Bonds has an in house rating system with Auto Owners which 
allowed Kirchen to use "information [he had] from the insured to go in [to a computer 
program] and classify business, rate it up, price it out, and then work with the 
underwriters on final pricing, coverages, etc." (R. 675 at 47) 
44. The underwriters at Auto Owners were comfortable with the pricing arrived 
at by Kirchen, but notified him that a final decision on writing the policy was subject to 
receiving his quote, his applications, the loss history (a.k.a. "loss runs"), property 
valuation and home office approval. (R. 675 at ^ |48) 
45. Kirchen thought the coverage specified in the guidelines provided by Reed 
was low, and he brought it to Reed's attention, but Reed told him that Farr only wanted 
an apples-to-apples comparison with the Trinity policy. (R. 675 at 1J49) 
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46. Kirchen, being aware of the "deadline," provided all the information he 
produced and collected to underwriting at Auto Owners on May 13, 2003 in an effort to 
bind coverage before the Trinity policy expired. (R. 676 at ^50) 
47. On May 14, 2003, Reed delivered to Kirchen two checks written by Fair; 
one for $12,410.50 payable to Farmers for the commercial auto coverage (which is not 
relevant to this litigation); and another check payable to Owners (a subsidiary or parent of 
Auto Owners) in the amount of $7,838.83. (R. 676 at 1151) 
48. Reed testified that Kirchen told him that they were "in the binder period" 
with Owners thereby requiring the check from Fair, but he did not know the length of the 
binder period. (R. 676 at 1J52) 
49. Several days after the deadline, Kirchen received a call from the 
underwriting department at Auto Owners indicating that "home office had declined the 
coverage - - or the coverages." (R. 676 at ^54) 
50. Kirchen immediately called Reed and "explained to him that the home 
office has declined the coverage and we're not going to be able to write the account." 
(R. 677 at 1f55) 
51. After holding the check for about three days, the uncashed check made 
payable to Owners was returned by Kirchen to Reed. (R. 677 at ^ [57) 
Granger, Trustco, Safeco And Hartford 
52. On May 23, 2003 (nine days following the expiration of the Trinity Policy 
and six days before the Loss), Kirchen (on Reed's behalf) contacted Granger of Trustco 
11 
and inquired whether he would be willing to place coverage for the property, liability and 
equipment breakdown risks "that day." (R. 677 at ^58) 
53. Reed knew that Trustco was an agent of Safeco, and he knew that Safeco 
had prepared a bid for coverage in connection with a submission from Jones on Farr's 
behalf. (R. 678 at TJ59) 
54. Kirchen told Granger that all Granger needed to do in order to get the 
account was to obtain a "broker of record letter" since Safeco already had all the 
information its underwriters needed through the quote obtained from Safeco by Jones. (R. 
678 at TJ60) 
55. Granger understood that Reed was trying to preclude Jones from placing 
the business because Jones would be a competitor that would threaten Reed's ability to 
control the entire Farr account. (R. 678 at TJ61) 
56. Granger then contacted Reed, who confirmed that he was looking to protect 
the other lines of the Farr account, and confirmed the details of Farr's lack of insurance 
coverage problem. (R. 678 at [^62) 
57. Granger prepared a letter dated May 23, 2003 which was faxed to Reed, 
placed on Farr letterhead and signed by Dexter Farr, and faxed back to Granger, which 
appointed Trustco as Farr's exclusive broker of record ("BOR") for Safeco. (R. 678 at 
H63) 
58. Until he was asked to sign the BOR, nobody at Farr had been told or was 
aware that Farr had been uninsured for more than a week. (R. 679 at Tf64) 
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59. The property, liability and equipment breakdown coverages for all of Farr's 
significant insurable risks was bound through Safeco effective May 23, 2003. (R. 679 at 
1166) 
60. Granger testified that he had authority to bind Safeco; that he did bind 
coverage and that "if there had been a problem with the binding process, I'm certain I 
would have been informed of that by Chatrice (the Safeco underwriter) on the very first 
day we attempted to do that. But there was no such problem." Granger's May 23, 2003 
notes state, "We did BOR letter & I talked to Chatrice. She confirmed she got it. / told 
her to go with all coverages except auto as they had gone to Farmers . . . " (emphasis 
added) (R. 2199 atf52) 
61. The Trustco/Granger evidence of communications with Safeco after May 
23, 2003, is that on May 27, 2003, Safeco territory manager Terri Dalton told Granger 
she was taking over the Fair file; that the Jones proposal was not a complete submission 
and that applications would need to be submitted as to what coverages were desired. 
Granger thereupon contacted Reed who supplied his file on Fair which included standard 
Acord application forms including applicant information, property and general liability 
sections which showed Central Bonds as the producer. These forms had been used by 
Reed and Kirchen in searching for an insurance company to write property/liability 
coverage for Fair. These forms showed "BPP coverage11 of $5,850,000 as to Farr's 2575 
South 300 West location; stated that Farr's business was " . . . A manufacturer and 
distributor of ice cream" and identified the nature of that Fair business location as 
13 
"Manufacturing, warehouse, office and storage." Reed also furnished Trustco "loss runs" 
and a "Statement of Values." (R. 2200 atf54) 
62. These documents were "jointly updated" by Granger and Reed on May 28, 
2003 (the day before the loss). Trustco's Acord commercial insurance application and a 
set of loss run documents, put together by Reed and Granger from information in Reed's 
file, were submitted to Safeco's Terri Dalton. (R. 2200 at ^ |55) 
63. Safeco's Terri Dalton called Granger again on May 29, 2003 because, 
Granger testified, "There were discrepancies between this submission that we sent and 
what Jones had submitted. . . . with regard to other coverage lines, umbrella and also 
equipment breakdown. . . . and the emphasis was on getting this into Safeco so that 
coverage may not be compromised/' (emphasis added) Terri Dalton requested a 
supplemental application for equipment breakdown and umbrella coverage, stating 
coverage for these had not been requested in the Jones submission. Granger again 
contacted Reed for assistance in putting the requested supplemental application together. 
Granger raised no question with Reed as to ice cream inventory coverage: "I was not in a 
position at that time to question him about what his client wanted because it was his 
client and he was coming to me with what his client wanted." "[H]e assured me that he 
would prefer that he just be the only one that deals with them because of the relationship 
he had with them." (R. 2201 at \51) 
64. Granger/Trustco/Safeco/American/Hartford did not directly communicate 
with Fair until after Farr's May 29, 2003 accident. (R. 2201 at 59) 
65. The Loss occurred on May 29, 2003. (R. 2203 at 1J63) 
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Post Loss Course Of Dealing 
66. After Reed learned from news reports about Fair's May 29, 2003 incident, 
Reed called Duane Farr: ". . . he just wanted to confirm that we didn't have to worry 
about it, that it was totally covered and that the insurance company would be taking care 
of it." (R. 2203 at 1J63) 
67. A reinsurance agreement between Safeco and Hartford Steam Boiler 
Inspection and Insurance Company (hereinafter "Hartford Steam Boiler" or "Hartford") 
provided that Hartford would adjust any claims, with payment to be made by Safeco. Id. 
at pp. 56-57. (R. 680atTf68) 
68. Following Fair's May 29, 2003 loss, Reed called Granger, as "Trustco and 
Troy Granger were on the general liabilities property exposure" and told Granger the 
situation and that "You're going to want to contact your claims people." Granger 
testified that he had some difficulty getting it reported "because of the fact that the policy 
hadn't even yet been issued and assigned a policy number, so it was in the binder period." 
(R.2203at1f64) 
69. Reed met with Michael Farr, Darin Farr and Nathan Farr after May 29, 
2003 to assist them in the process of dealing with the loss "to help them . . . give them 
a little counsel as to what was going to be coming from their general liability carrier." 
(R.2204at1f66) 
70. Michael Farr, Fair's Vice President, testified that he first spoke to Reed by 
telephone and later in person on June 3, 2003 and that Reed "was very reassuring about 
the coverage." (R. 2204 at }^66) 
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71. The Safeco policy was prepared on June 4, 2003 and delivered to Fair on 
June 20, 2003. (R. 680 at TJ69) 
72. When Trustco/Granger received and gave the Safeco Policy to Reed, Reed 
took it to a meeting with the Fairs. (R. 2206 at ^73) 
73. When the policy was delivered, Farr learned, for the first time, that an 
endorsement extended coverage for inventory loss through spoilage to $25,000. (R. 680 
at 1|70) 
74. The Safeco Policy Declarations and other [complex/prolix/confusing] 
forms in the Safeco Policy forms package include those set forth in R. 2209-2219. 
75. To date, approximately $75,000.00 has been paid on Farr's extensive loss. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal primarily deals with the trial court's award of summary judgment to 
the appellees, and the trial court's failure to award summary judgment in favor of Farr. A 
threshold issue is whether the trial court justifiably failed to consider Farr's claims for 
breach of the oral insurance binders that occurred in this case as well as Farr's assertion 
that ambiguities existed in the Safeco policy that was eventually issued in the case. The 
trial court expressly indicated it would not consider these issues despite the fact that Fan-
had asserted a "breach of contract" claim in its complaint and notwithstanding the fact 
that these issues were fully briefed and submitted to the trial court. It is Farr's position 
that the oral binder/policy ambiguity issues fall squarely within the breach of contract 
cause of action in its complaint, and the trial court committed error when it failed to 
consider these claims. 
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Fair also contends that there is no question of material fact that Trustco orally 
bound insurance coverage for Fair with Safeco/American States/Hartford and at the 
behest of Reed. There is also no material question of fact that neither Reed, Safeco, 
American States nor Hartford communicated to Fair that there were any limitations or 
exclusions to the coverage which was orally bound. In fact, Trustco agent Granger 
testified at deposition that when speaking with a Safeco underwriter about binding the 
coverage he stated, "I told her to go with all coverages except auto...." There is also no 
question the Loss occurred during the binder period prior to the time the Safeco policy 
was issued. As the aforementioned facts are uncontested, as a matter of Utah law, Fair 
was entitled to "all coverages" which are reasonable to fully insure Farr for the loss it 
incurred. Consequently, Fair's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of 
liability should have been granted. 
In relation to the trial court granting appellees' motions for summary judgment, it 
is Farr's position that the trial court improperly determined that no questions of material 
fact remained in the case. In addition to the breach of contract claim set forth above, Farr 
asserted claims for negligence, estoppel and bad faith. Farr has alleged that Reed made 
certain representations to Farr regarding the nature and extent of coverage which had 
been obtained for Farr. Farr contends that the facts of this case establish that Reed was 
acting as the statutory and/or common law agent of the insurance agents, insurance 
agencies and insurers that are involved in this matter. As Reed was the agent of these 
individuals and entities, Reed's actions and conduct bound these individuals and agencies 
and subjected the same to liability. Whether an agency arrangement exists is a uniquely 
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factual issue. Given the facts of this case, especially when viewed in a light most 
favorable to Fair, the trial court should not have precluded Fair from asserting its claims 
that Reed negligently misrepresented information it provided to Farr, negligently failed to 
provide adequate coverage for Farr, and that Farr relied on Reed's statements to its 
detriment. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Each of the parties herein filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court 
denied Farr's summary judgment motion and granted the motions for summary judgment 
submitted by the appellees. Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P. governs when summary 
judgment is appropriate. Rule 56(c) provides in relevant part as follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Consequently, two requirements exist in order for a trial court to properly render 
summary judgment. First, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact. Second, 
the moving entity must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The trial court erred when it failed to award summary judgment in favor of Farr. 
It also erred when it awarded summary judgment in favor of the appellees. Farr has 
asserted claims against the appellees for: 1) breach of contract; 2) negligence; 3) bad 
faith; and 4) promissory estoppel. The trial court in its ruling ("Ruling") acknowledged 
Farr had asserted these claims. (R. 3499) As a threshold issue, the trial court should 
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have determined whether questions of material facts existed and view those facts in a 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Second, the trial court should have 
determined whether the moving parties were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The summary judgment motion issues are addressed below. 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO EVALUATE ALL OF 
FARRfS CLAIMS FOR 1) BREACH OF CONTRACT; 2) NEGLIGENCE; 3) BAD 
FAITH; AND 4) PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
As part of its Ruling, the trial court noted Farr had asserted claims for 1) breach of 
contract; 2) negligence; 3) bad faith; and 4) promissory estoppel. (R. 3534 at P. 3) Near 
the beginning of oral argument on the summary judgment issues, Hartford's counsel 
alleged Farr had asserted new and distinct theories from those set forth in Farr's operative 
complaint. In response to Hartford's counsel, the trial court stated in relevant part: 
And may I just say, and I apologize for interrupting you, but I—I 
noted that in some of the defendants' pleadings and it would be my position 
that we have the third amended complaint that's the operative complaint, I 
don't plan to rule on any theory that I'm convinced is not in that complaint; 
of course, I'll let Mr. Martineau respond and tell me if it is in the third 
amended complaint, but if it's not there, I'm not going to rule on it. 
(Id. at p. 7) 
The trial court's ruling acknowledges Farr's claims for breach of contract, 
negligence, bad faith and estoppel in one place, and further states, "Each of Farr's causes 
of action stem from the so-called 'Reed's Commitment' in which Farr alleges that Reed 
bound the primary defendants for all of Farr's insurance risks." The trial court then 
stated: 
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Specifically, Fair claims on and before May 14, 2003, Andrew Reed 
while acting both for himself and as the duly authorized agent for TIE, 
Trustco, Safeco, American, Hartford, Kirchen, Central Agency, Central 
Bonds and Auto Owners ("Primary Defendants") had received payment for 
and affirmatively represented to plaintiff: (a) that the Primary Defendants 
had duly bound and provided plaintiff with all necessary and appropriate 
insurance coverage for all of plaintiff s significant insurable risks, including 
all insurable risks related to Plaintiffs Products, and (b) that the Primary 
Defendants, and each, of them had agreed, committed, and become jointly 
obligated to provide plaintiff with all such necessary, available and 
appropriate insurance coverage for all of Plaintiffs Products and all of 
plaintiffs significant insurable risks ("Reeds Commitment") effective May 
14,2003. 
(R. 3501) 
It appears the trial court construed the claims set forth in Farr's complaint very 
narrowly. In fact, the trial court stated, "Farr's Third Amended Complaint shall be the 
operative complaint for consideration of all remaining motions and to that extent the 
Court will not address Farr's "new" claims involving allegations of an oral binder and 
policy ambiguity." 
Notwithstanding the trial court's position, the fact remains, an "oral binder" is a 
form of contract that can be breached. In fact, the Farr's complaint clearly states the 
claim that the defendant's had duly bound the insurance coverage and then Farr alleged 
the contract had been breached. The trial court should not have so narrowly construed 
Farr's complaint. The issues were fully briefed and presented to the trial court. As the 
Utah Supreme Court recently noted in Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 158 P.3d 
1088 (Utah 2007): 
Such an exalting of form over substance, while not unknown in our 
caselaw, is to be avoided when possible. Our rules of pleading require that 
a cause be made out, but not necessarily that it always be correctly labeled. 
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In Youngbloods case, and in others of the same type, the defendant 
insurance company is denied nothing in terms of knowing what is being 
claimed and how to defend. 
Where, as here, plaintiff has brought a claim for breach of contract, and where 
defendant were placed on fall notice of the details of plaintiffs claims, the trial court 
should have fully considered whether summary judgment was appropriate based upon the 
"oral binder" and "policy ambiguity" claims. The trial court erred when it did not do so. 
This case should be decided on its merits and not upon a limited and unjustified narrow 
categorization of Farr's claims. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED FARR'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SAFECO, AMERICAN STATES, 
HARTFORD, TRUSTCO AND REED ON LIABILITY ISSUES 
There is no question of fact that Safeco (who was acting at the request of Trustco, 
who in turn was acting at the behest of Reed), orally bound the coverage that was 
effective on the date of the Loss. It is clear that neither Reed, Trustco, Safeco, American 
States nor Hartford explained to Farr, orally or in writing, that the May 23, 2003 oral 
binder of insurance coverage (or the policy to be thereafter issued by Safeco), would 
purportedly provide only token ($25,000.00) ice cream inventory product loss coverage, 
thus leaving Farr with a huge uninsured inventory loss should Farr's inventory be 
destroyed by "equipment breakdown" or "ammonia contamination" or "spoilage." 
Utah case law makes it abundantly clear that insurers may not enforce even clearly 
stated policy coverage exclusions or exceptions when they have not been clearly 
communicated to the insured in writing. Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141 
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(Utah App. 1991), (holding unenforceable coverage exclusions not set forth in the 
certificate given an insured employee notwithstanding the employer had the master plan 
which included the clearly stated exclusions); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 
231 (Utah 1985), (holding a household exclusion in an automobile insurance policy 
unenforceable since it had not been communicated to the insured) and General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d498 (Utah 1983). 
The reasons for imposing this communication duty on producer/insurer conduct 
have been repeatedly stated by the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals. 
These reasons are that insurance contracts are "contracts of adhesion" not negotiated at 
arms length; insurance policy provisions are drafted by insurers to protect their self 
interests; insurers bury exclusions in fine print in insurer drafted policies and policies; 
contain unread/not understood or understandably ambiguous or conflicting provisions 
purporting as interpreted by insurers, to exclude and/or limit the coverage the insured 
reasonably believes is provided by the policy. Therefore, the Utah Courts will not allow 
insurers to avoid coverage representations by means of exclusions or limitations that are 
not communicated to or agreed to by the insured. Insureds are entitled to be specifically 
informed in writing of exclusionary policy terms. See discussions in above cited cases 
and in Marriott v. Pacific Natl Life Insurance Co., 467 P.2d 981 Utah (1970) which 
noted that insurers and insureds are in very unequal bargaining positions; that courts 
recognize that and therefore do not support insurance companies holding out promises of 
coverage with one hand by means of a promise in one part of the insurance contract, then 
taking that coverage promise away somewhere else. 
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Clear full insurance coverage for loss of Farr's personal property product 
inventory, however caused, was (and is) available from the insurance market and was 
obtained by Farr after May 23, 2003 from Cincinnati Insurance Company subsequent to 
the Loss. 
As a matter of law, the Utah Insurance Code specifically authorizes oral binders of 
property insurance coverage, such as the oral binder of coverage for Farr that took place 
on May 23, 2003, six days before the accident which resulted in ammonia contamination 
loss of Farr's manufactured and stored ice cream inventory. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-102 states in relevant part: "(2) Binding oral contracts 
of insurance may only be made as to. . . property insurance. . . The insurer shall issue 
a policy or a binder as soon as reasonably possible after negotiation of any oral contract 
under this subsection." Here, Safeco, Trustco and Reed orally bound property insurance 
coverage for Farr with Safeco, American and Hartford without any agreed exceptions or 
limitations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-23a-405, provides: "There is a rebuttable presumption that 
every insurer is bound by any act of it's appointed licensee performed in this state that is 
within the scope of the licensee's actual (express or implied) or apparent authority". 
The Utah Insurance Code specifically makes it the duty of insurers to not make 
"any agreement of insurance that is not clearly expressed in the policy to be issued or 
renewed." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-402 (2)(a)(ii). The practical effect of that 
Insurance Code mandate is to preclude insurers from purporting to unilaterally reduce the 
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coverage promised by an orally bound insurance contract by means of issuing a coverage 
gap policy, post loss or otherwise. 
That Insurance Code requirement is imminently fair. When coverage is 
committed, coverage has to be provided. Here Safeco quickly determined via phone 
conversations with Trustco/Granger that Safeco would back their agent in acquiring Fair 
as a customer by orally binding insurance coverage without agreed limitations/exclusions 
even before receiving a complete written insurance application. 
Fair certainly did not agree orally or in writing to accept grossly insufficient 
inventory coverage if inventory loss occurred by reason of ammonia contamination, 
equipment breakdown or spoilage. Safeco (and its reinsurer Hartford) bound coverage 
without any such limitations, accepted such risks of loss and were and are clearly 
precluded by the Utah Insurance Code from a few days later engaging in a proscribed 
unfair self serving marketing practice by purporting to issue a no real coverage policy via 
buried language Safeco/Hartford issues post loss to avoid the oral coverage promise. 
Estoppel is another principle of justice by means of which Utah Courts prevent 
insurers from refusing to support their producer/agents coverage representations and 
promises, even in cases of agent oral misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the 
terms of insurance policies offered by insurers. Younghlood II v. Auto-Owners Insurance 
Co., 2005 Ut.App.154 (Case No. 20040184-CA, March 31, 2005) and General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. 
In Younghlood II the insurer's agent told the insured that uninsured motorist 
coverage would cover injuries to the insured, who reasonably relied on that 
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representation. The Court held the insurer estopped to deny the agent's representation by 
denying coverage, stating that an insured is entitled to rely on an agent's superior 
knowledge; that policies are unreadable; that insureds are justified in not attempting to 
read them and in relying on agent's oral representations and that policy un-clarity 
justifies insured's reliance on agent's representations. 
In General Motors, the Court held G.M.A.C. estopped to enforce a pre-existing 
medical condition policy exclusion since the insurance agent had not explained that 
exclusion to the insured when selling the policy and collecting the premium. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 addresses the unreasonably of 
allowing businesses which require use of only their standardized contract forms to 
unfairly deal with their unsuspecting necessarily reliant customers by means of 
unsuspected unread contract terms by voiding such terms when the business has reason to 
believe the customer would not have entered into the contract had the terms been known 
to the customer. 
If producers and insurers can obtain premium revenue and insurance customers by 
purporting to bind coverage orally but then, after a loss occurs, use policy language (or an 
insurer's post loss interpretation of policy language) to deny coverage, the insurance 
business is thereby rendered but a scam enabling insurers to keep premiums while 
leaving the insurance client with "surprise to the client" losses. 
Fair is entitled to a summary judgment determining as a matter of law that 
Safeco VHartford's post-loss coverage exclusion and limitation interpretation of 
language in the Safeco policy is unenforceable by reason of Reed, Trustco, Safeco and 
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Hartford not having made exclusions and limitations a disclosed and agreed upon part of 
the May 23, 2003 oral insurance coverage binder. 
Point HI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF SAFECO, HARTFORD, TRUSTCO AND REED 
In granting Hartford's, Safeco's, Trustco's and Reed's motions for summary 
judgment, the trial court consistently found "the record contains no evidence of agency 
relationship" between Reed and Hartford, Safeco or Trustco. Such is not the case. 
The record in this case establishes that Reed is the only insurance agent who ever 
met and dealt directly with Farr. It was Reed who had consistently presented himself to 
Farr in the capacity as an experienced and qualified insurance agent who met with 
Trustco in an effort to secure insurance coverage for Farr. Trustco, through its 
representative Granger, purposefully allowed Reed, and only Reed, to meet with Farr. 
(The facts in this matter indicate that Reed wanted to be the primary and only direct 
contact with Farr. This way, it would and did appear to Farr that Reed was the agent 
directly providing the coverage and would help insulate the other business Reed had 
placed with Farr and buffer an "unfriendly agent" from impacting the Reed-Farr 
insurance relationship. Trustco knowingly went along with this arrangement.) 
Trustco directed Reed to obtain the Broker of Record letter and explained to Reed 
what was needed in that regard. Trustco was relying on Reed in relation to Trustco's 
dealings with Farr. It was Reed who collected the premium check on Trustco's behalf. 
Trustco used Reed to obtain information about Farr and Fair's operations. 
26 
The facts in this matter clearly demonstrate that Reed was authorized by Trustco 
to act on its behalf and was subject to Trustco's control in relation to the Farr transaction. 
Consequently, an agency relationship was entered into between Trustco and Reed. The 
trial court appears to have only considered a statutory relationship between the parties, 
but does not consider a common law agency relationship. The trial court correctly notes 
that, "To be an agent, a person 'must be authorized by another to act on his behalf or in 
his control.'" When viewed in a light most favorable to Farr, the facts establish that 
Trustco authorized Reed to act on its behalf in relation to the Farr insurance coverage. 
By virtue of the agency relationship, Reed's actions, including his representations 
(or negligent misrepresentations as the case may be) that Farr was fully covered bound 
Trustco. In turn, Trustco's actions bound Safeco and Hartford. This is true because 
Trustco is the statutory agent of Safeco, and Hartford is contractually bound to Safeco. 
Under Utah law, knowledge of an agent concerning the business which he is 
transacting for his principal is imputed to his principal. Swan Creek Village Homeowners 
v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122 (Utah 2006). The trial court's ruling that no evidence is 
contained in the record which support an agency relationship ignores the fact that Trustco 
had no direct dealings with Farr in relation to the oral binder and further omits the fact 
2
 In Phillips v. JCMDevelopment Corporation, 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed Restatement (Second) of Agency §406 (1958) and stated, "The 
liability of an agent for the acts of a subagent has been set forth as follows: Unless 
otherwise agreed, an agent is responsible to the principal for the conduct of a subservant 
or other subagent with reference to the principal's affairs entrusted to the subagent, as the 
agent is for his own conduct; and as to other matters, as a principal is for the conduct of a 
servant or other agent. And further: An agent who employs a subagent is the latter's 
principal and is responsible ... to his principal for the subagent's derelictions. Thus, the 
agent is subject to liability to the principal for harm to the principal's property or business 
caused by the subagent's negligence or other wrong to the principal's interest. 
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that Trustco agreed to allow Reed to deal with Fair on Trustco's behalf. If Reed was not 
acting on behalf of Trustco, how did Trustco obtain Fair's account? 
It is beyond question that Safeco bound "all coverages except auto" for Fan-
through Truscto. Even if it were assumed Reed was not authorized to act on behalf of 
Trustco (or Safeco for that matter), both Trustco and Safeco ratified Reed's acts in 
relation to the Fair coverage. Couch On Insurance, §44:19 states in relevant part as 
follows: 
The lawful act of any person, whether that of an agent acting in 
excess of his or her authority or the act of a stranger who is not an agent for 
any purpose, may be ratified." **** To constitute ratification it is only 
necessary that the insurer manifest its assent to the unauthorized act. **** 
If an unauthorized person solicits an application for insurance, and 
the insurer recognizes the regularity of the application and the legitimacy of 
the channel through which it comes, it thereby places such person upon 
[the] same foundation, and invest[s] him or her with the same authority, as 
its commissioned agents. **** 
Ratification may be made at any time provided the insured has not 
withdrawn from the transaction. Ratification may thus be made either 
before or after loss. 
Here, the facts (especially when viewed in a light most favorable to Fair) indicate 
Reed was acting as an agent (which in various contexts has been called a "subagent" or 
"subservant") of Trustco. Trustco authorized Reed to act on its behalf. In so doing, 
Trustco adopted Reed's acts and representations. In any event, both Trustco and Safeco 
ratified Reeds acts and representations when Granger (as Trustco's representative) 
requested that Safeco bind "all coverages" and Safeco thereafter bound the coverage. 
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Trustco spoke to Safeco and worked jointly with Reed to get a "broker of record" 
letter prepared, signed and faxed to Safeco's underwriter Chatrice Felix. Trustco told 
Felix the "broker of record"3 letter would be coming and that "we would like to get 
coverage bound effective today". "I told her to go with all coverages except auto. . ." 
(emphasis added) (R. 2199 at 1J52) 
Trustco was thus obviously acting exactly as expected of an insurance producer in 
seeking to bind and in binding coverage for Farr, a commercial insurance customer which 
happened to have been referred to Trustco by Kirchen and Reed. Trustco did not decline 
to bind coverage "effective today" based upon the fact that Fair had not talked to Trustco 
directly nor refused to do so until Trustco had directly assessed Farr's insurance coverage 
needs. 
Certainly nothing in the Utah Insurance Code or relevant Utah insurance case law 
relieves a licensed appointed insurance producer from responsibility for failing in that 
producer's undertaking to bind and obtain insurance for the reason that the insurance 
client has been referred by another agent, or when the producer has not communicated 
directly with the client, only receiving a binder request through another producer, or 
when the producer has not personally assessed the business client's insurance needs. 
Neither the Utah Insurance Code nor case law relieves an insurance producer or a 
"broker of record", which has bound coverage orally, from responsibility as claimed by 
3
 Trustco does not disclaim responsibility, nor could Trustco disclaim 
responsibility, for accepting Farr's written May 23, 2003 appointment of Trustco, a 
licensed, appointed Safeco "producer" of commercial insurance, as Farr's "broker of 
record" for the specific purpose of binding/obtaining Safeco insurance coverage for Farr. 
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the producer and insurers herein, for a failed oral binder of insurance coverage because of 
the time requirements which necessitated the immediate oral binding of coverage. 
The very reason for the existence of oral binders of insurance coverage is to get 
insurance coverage bound when time constraints preclude delaying needed insurance 
coverage until insurance applications are processed and policies issued. See discussion in 
Parlier Fruit Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 311 P.2d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) in which 
essentially the only thing the agent knew about a packing house insurance client was that 
use and occupancy insurance was requested. The agent told the client the agent would 
bind insurance for $75,000 until a representative arrived to determine the best insurance 
for the packing house. Only limited communications took place between the agent and 
several insurance companies. A judgment in favor of the insurers was reversed, the Court 
specifically ruling that binding oral contracts of insurance may be made by insurer's 
agents with only limited information, and further ruling that in that circumstance the 
policy contemplated is the type and form usually issued to an insured in the same type 
and class of business- a policy reasonably suited to the insured's situation. 
Not only was Trustco willing to act but it did act in contacting Safeco and in 
binding Safeco commercial insurance coverage for Farr. Troy Granger testified, and Fan-
insurance applications prepared by Trustco and Reed show, that Trustco followed up 
several times in submitting insurance application after insurance application requested by 
Safeco for Fair insurance coverage. Granger testified that there was emphasis on getting 
additional forms to Safeco as late as May 29, 2003 (the morning before Farr's accident): 
"There were discrepancies between this submission we sent and what Blackburn-Jones 
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had submitted. . . with regard to other coverage lines, umbrella and also equipment 
breakdown. . . and the emphasis was on getting this into Safeco so that coverage may 
not be compromised." 
Safeco already had some information concerning Farr and the commercial 
business insurance Farr required and the post loss application forms Trustco and Reed 
prepared at Safeco's request show Trustco obtained substantial additional information 
concerning the nature and extent of Fair's ice cream business. They show the value of 
Fair's property, including the value of Fair's personal property ice cream product 
inventory. The fact Trustco filled out those forms, with Reed's assistance or otherwise, 
shows the clearest assumption of full responsibility by Trustco to get proper insurance 
coverage for Farr so "coverage may not be compromised"- as Granger explicitly testified. 
If, in the process of orally binding coverage on May 23, 2003, or in the process of 
submitting multiple Farr insurance applications after May 23, 2003, Trustco failed to get 
proper inventory coverage for Fair, not having communicated directly with Farr, not 
having obtained Fair's consent to a huge inventory coverage limitation, then clearly 
Trustco breached: 1) Trustco's oral "all coverages" binder; 2) Trustco's undertaking to 
get proper coverages; and 3) Trustco's assumed duty to "fix it now", showing at that 
point that any question concerning Fair's coverage needed to be fixed so that Farr would 
have the coverage it was entitled to per Fair's CGL Coverage. These were Trustco's 
expert insurance agent contractual, fiduciary and due care duties to Farr. Lay insurance 
client Fair was entitled to rely on performance of those duties. If and to the extent that 
Trustco failed, Trustco is obligated to Farr for Fair's ensuing damages. 
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In Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d 728 (Utah 2004), insurance agent Albrecht had 
provided Harris an automobile insurance policy and an umbrella insurance policy for the 
Harris' home, boat and recreational vehicle. Harris would generally talk to Albrecht by 
telephone requesting coverage followed by Albrecht providing insurance without detailed 
discussion of different types of coverages. Harris contacted Albrecht to obtain business 
insurance for Harris' architectural firm, telling Albrecht to place business and fire 
coverage on his equipment and office contents. Harris testified Albrecht responded by 
saying he would take care of it and come out and look at the equipment. No oral binder 
of insurance coverage was issued or mentioned. Five months later, after fire destroyed 
the building occupied by the Harris architectural firm, Harris called Albrecht and asked: 
"You placed that [business] coverage we talked about, didn't you?" Albrecht replied: 
"We talked about it Ken, but we never did anything about it." The Court held that 
whether a contract or duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the Court and 
reviewed the law concerning the formation of contracts including the principle that the 
formation of a contract requires a meeting of the minds. The Court said the issue 
presented was whether an oral contract to procure insurance existed, stating the insurance 
client is bargaining for: 
. . . the services of the insurance agent in obtaining the best 
possible terms consistent with the owner's insurance needs. Such a 
contract could arise even though the agent was given the authority to 
ascertain some of the facts essential to the creation of the ultimate contract 
of insurance, such as the appraised value of the property to be covered or 
the most advantageous premium. Obviously, liability for failure to procure 
insurance could not arise unless the agent had sufficiently definite 
directions from his principal to enable him to consummate the final 
insurance contract. . . [A]n express agreement is not necessary; the scope 
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of the risk, the subject matter to be covered, the duration of the insurance, 
and other elements can be found by implication. . . . Therefore, a contract 
to procure insurance may arise when the agent has definite directions from 
the insured to consummate a final contract, when the scope, subject matter, 
duration and other elements can be found by implication, and when the 
insured gives the agent authority to ascertain some of the essential facts. 
(emphasis added). 
The Court stated that Albrecht had no information concerning Harris's 
architectural business because all of Harris's previous policies were personal; that the 
agent could not identify the scope of the risk, the subject matter, the duration or other 
elements by implication and that Harris failed to give Albrecht authority to ascertain 
some of the essential facts. As to whether Albrecht assumed a duty to procure insurance 
when he told Harris "he would take care of that" the Court said that the conduct of the 
parties must be looked to as well as the communications between them: 
. . . and more specifically to the extent to which they indicate that 
the agent has acknowledged an obligation to secure a policy. Where an 
insurance agent or broker promises, or gives some affirmative assurance, 
that he will procure or renew a policy of insurance under circumstances 
which lull the insured into the belief that such insurance has been effected, 
the law will impose upon the broker or agent the obligation to perform the 
duty which he has thus assumed, (emphasis added). 
As to whether Albrecht "acknowledged an obligation to secure a policy" the 
Court said the statement "he would take care of that, he would come out and look at the 
equipment" was not "a bare acknowledgment of an obligation to procure insurance" 
because his statement that he would come out and look at the equipment indicated 
Albrecht needed to gather more information or do other work before procuring the policy. 
"A bare acknowledgment occurs when an agent confirms coverage pending the issuance 
of a formal policy." The Court held the agent's comments failed to rise to the level of a 
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promise to procure insurance- an agent "must affirmatively assure the insured that a 
policy will be procured or has been procured." The Court further held that even if 
Albrecht lulled Harris into believing Albrecht would procure a policy, the fact Harris 
never completed an application, never received a bill or policy and was never contacted 
by Albrecht in the five months after the conversation should have put Harris on notice he 
did not yet have a policy. The Court further noted there is a significant distinction 
between business insurance policies and personal insurance policies and stated the ease of 
procuring an auto or homeowners policy contrasts sharply with the customization 
required for a business policy. "It was impossible for Albrecht to provide Harris with a 
'standard business policy'. A policy for an architectural business requires more 
customization than one for a simple retail business. It was also beyond Albrecht's 
authority to bind State Farm to coverage for the valuable papers of an architectural 
business. The Court stated that the three elements that create a duty to procure insurance 
are 1) an undertaking or agreement by the agent to procure insurance; 2) failure of the 
agent to use reasonable diligence in attempting to place the insurance and failure to notify 
the client promptly if he has failed to obtain insurance and 3) the actions of the agent 
warrant an assumption by the client that he was properly insured. The Court's conclusion 
was: 
A contract to procure insurance may arise when the agent has 
definite directions from the insured to consummate a final contract; when 
the scope, subject matter, duration and other elements can be found by 
implication; and when the insured gives authority to ascertain some of the 
essential facts. A duty to procure insurance may arise when an agent 
accepts an application; makes a bare acknowledgement of a contract 
covering a specific kind of casualty; lulls the other party into believing a 
34 
contract has been effected through promises; and has taken care of the 
insured's needs without consultation in the past. 
Here Trastco did more than contract to procure insurance, more than simply 
"acknowledging an obligation to secure a policy". Trustco had Safeco bind coverage. 
Trustco filled out follow up application forms. A policy was issued, which, was clearly 
not in accordance with the binder nor (per Harris v. Albrecht) "the best possible terms 
consistent with the owners (Farr's) insurance needs". 
In Utah, insurance producer/agents have the duty of accurately representing policy 
provisions and honestly answering client questions, not refusing to do so. Youngblood if 
Such is also a statutory duty imposed by the Utah Insurance Code's Unfair Marketing 
Practices act, U.C.A. § 31A-23a-402 which prohibits insurer and agent communications 
which are false or misleading. 
Utah Law enforces a honest, accurate communication duty by invalidating 
coverage limitation/exceptions "when they have not been clearly communicated to the 
insured in writing". Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1991). 
Simply stated, the facts when viewed in a light most favorable to Farr establish 
that Reed was attempting to obtain insurance coverage for Farr. Reed had discussed with 
Farr its needs for insurance coverage. Reed was aware of Fair's coverage needs and 
made efforts to obtain coverage from several companies. Reed made representations that 
4
 As stated in Youngblood II, "the law holds insurance agents to accurately representing 
policy provisions and honestly answering consumer questions. Agents who are not 
trained to act with complete honesty and integrity in their interactions with consumers, or 
who simply refuse to do so, place themselves and their principals at risk. The law will 
hold both principal and agent liable for misrepresentations upon which consumers 
reasonably rely." 
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it would provide Farr with appropriate insurance coverage and Fair relied on those 
representation to its detriment. In his attempts to obtain insurance coverage, Reed acted 
as an agent for and on behalf of Granger and Trustco, who were statutory agents of 
insurance companies. Reed's representations regarding coverage bound Granger and 
Trustco which in turn bound Safeco and Hartford. Based upon the foregoing facts, 
summary judgment was not appropriate. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF KIRCHEN, CENTRAL BONDS AND AUTO OWNERS 
In order for the trial court to have appropriately granted summary judgment in 
favor of Kirchen, Central Bonds and Auto Owners, it must have determined that there 
were no questions of material fact and that Kirchen, Central Bonds and Auto Owners 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reaching its decision regarding summary 
judgment, the trial court apparently only considered the following and indicated that the 
same were "undisputed facts": 
In March 2003, Reed contacted Steven Kirchen ("Kirchen") of 
Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Central Bonds"). At Reed's 
request, Kirchen contacted other agents and insurers and eventually 
obtained a bid from Auto Owners Insurance Company ("Auto Owners"). 
Auto Owners indicated, however, that any writing on the Farr policy was 
subject to office approval and additional insurer information on items such 
as loss history and property valuations. 
On May 14, 2003, Farr delivered a check to Auto Owners in the 
amount of $7,838.83 for property, liability and equipment breakdown 
coverages. Shortly thereafter, Auto Owners' underwriting department 
declined coverage on the Farr account and returned the Fair's uncashed 
check. 
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(R. 3500) 
For the following reasons, summary judgment was not warranted. 
Farr asserted claims against Kirchen, Central Bonds and Auto Owners on the basis 
that Kirchen (at the behest of Reed), through Central Bonds, bound insurance coverage 
from Auto Owners. Farr claimed that despite the fact coverage was bound, Kirchen, 
Central Bonds and Auto Owners failed to provide coverage in accordance with the oral 
contract of insurance. In essence, Farr alleged a breach of contract occurred. 
The Auto Owners coverage was solicited, negotiated, bound and sold to Farr by 
Kirchen and Central Bonds in their capacity as statutory and common law agents for 
Central Bonds. The statutory agency relationship is clearly established by the following 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301 (84)(a) and (b)(i): 
(a) "Insurance producer" or "producer" means a person licensed 
or required to be licensed under the laws of this state to sell, solicit, 
or negotiate insurance. 
(b) With regards to the selling, soliciting, or negotiating of an 
insurance product to an insurance customer or an insured: 
(i) "producer for the insurer" means a producer who is 
compensated directly or indirectly by an insurer for selling, 
soliciting, or negotiating any product of that insurer; (emphasis 
added) 
With regard to the Auto Owners coverage, Kirchen and Central Bonds were each 
licensed to sell, solicit, negotiate, and sell coverage to Farr, and did so as producers for 
Auto Owners as an insurer under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301 (86)(a)(i) which provides: 
(a) "Insurer" means any person doing an insurance 
business as a principal including: 
(E) any person purporting or intending to do an 
insurance business as a principal on that person's own 
account. 
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Auto Owners conducts an insurance business as a principal on own its personal account. 
When viewed in a light most favorable to Fair, the coverage was orally bound on 
May 14, 2003 by Kirchen and Central Bonds for Auto Owners pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-21-102: 
(2) Binding oral contracts of insurance may only be made as 
to casualty insurance, liability insurance, property insurance, 
vehicle liability insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and 
as to combinations of these coverages. The insurer shall issue a 
policy or binder as soon as reasonably possible after negotiation 
of any oral contract under this subsection. 
On that date Reed, requested and Dexter Fair provided to him a premium payment 
check in the amount of $7,838.83 made payable to "Owners". In addition, Auto Owners 
issued its ambiguous Tailored Protection Policy Proposal for Fair with an effective date 
ofMarchl5,2003. 
The coverage was so bound and was never canceled by Auto-Owners as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-102(5). Consequently, the coverage was in full force and 
effect on the date of the Farr's Loss herein. 
Auto-Owners also became liable to Fair for the acts and omissions of Reed as 
Kirchen's, Central Bond's and Auto Owner's apparent and/or common law agent. 
Significantly, Reed was the only agent who ever dealt directly with Fair. The others 
relied solely on Reed as Farr's only contact. Although Reed was the only agent that dealt 
directly with Fair, both Kirchen and Central Bonds acted jointly with Reed in connection 
with the solicitation, negotiation, binding, and sale to Fair of the coverage for which Auto 
Owners is liable to plaintiff. 
Auto-Owners breached the duties owed by it to Fair in the following respects: 
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First, Auto Owners breached the duties owed by it for the acts and breaches of 
duty on the part of Kirchen and Central Bonds as Auto-Owners' statutory agents under 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-213a-405(2) and (3) which provide: 
(2) There is a rebuttal presumption that every insurer is 
bound by any act of its appointed licensee performed in this state 
that is within the scope of the appointed licensee's actual (express 
or implied) or apparent authority, until the insurer has canceled 
the appointed licensee's appointment and has made reasonable 
efforts to recover from the appointed licensee its policy forms and 
other indicia of agency. Reasonable efforts include a formal 
demand in writing for return of the indicia, and notice to the 
commissioner if the appointed licensee does not promptly comply 
with the demand. The Subsection (2) neither waives any common 
law defense available to insurers, nor precludes the insured from 
seeking redress against the appointed licensee individually or 
jointly against the insurer and licensee. 
(3) When a licensee under this chapter with authority to bind 
more than one insurer on a particular risk agrees to bind coverage 
on a particular risk, but fails to outwardly indicate the insurer with 
which risk is placed, and before the risk is placed with a particular 
insurer a loss occurs, if there is no conclusive admissible evidence 
indicating the insurer with which the licensee exercised his 
binding authority, a court may equitably apportion the loss among 
all insurers with which the licensee had binding authority as to the 
particular type of risk. 
Second, Auto Owners breached the duties owed by it to Farr to promptly 
investigate, fairly evaluate and timely pay Fair's claim for the damages suffered by it as a 
consequence of the May 29, 2006 accident. In so doing, Auto Owners owed Farr an 
affirmative duty to evaluate and deal with plaintiffs claims on at least as favorable basis 
as that upon which it evaluated its own interests. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 701 P. 2d 
795 (Utah 1985); Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-303(3)(h); Rule R 590-190-9(6), (12) and 
(20), and Rule R 590-190-10(3), Utah Unfair Property Liability and Title Claims 
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Settlement Practices Rules. Instead Auto-Owners failed and refused in bad faith and in 
its own self interest to acknowledge and perform such duties. 
Based upon the foregoing, there remain questions of fact as to whether insurance 
coverage was bound, the amount of coverage which was bound and whether that 
coverage was ever cancelled. Consequently, summary judgment was not appropriate. 
The facts in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to Farr establish 
that Reed and Kirchen assumed a duty to procure the insurance. Kirchen and Central 
Bonds have not exercised good faith and fair dealing by now claiming that such coverage 
was not procured. At the very least there is a material factual issue at to whether the 
subject coverage was in fact bound and/or cancelled. Kirchen and Central Bonds 
voluntarily allowed Reed to act on their behalf in dealing with Farr. Reed has testified he 
understood the Subject Coverage was bound. A premium deposit was paid for the 
Subject Coverage, and the Fair's loss occurred prior to receiving any written notice of 
cancellation of the Subject Coverage. Consequently, the Subject Coverage was in effect 
on the date of the loss. 
Point V 
THERE IS NO BASIS TO ALLOCATE FAULT TO TRINITY, JONES AND 
BLACKBURN JONES IN THIS MATTER 
Prior to summary judgment being entered by the trial court herein, Farr filed a 
motion for summary judgment on a "allocation of fault" issue. Some of the defendants 
filed notice of their intent to apportion fault to the Trinity, Unitrin and the Jones 
defendants. However, no specific basis for the apportionment of fault was set forth. In 
40 
order to avoid the risk of an "empty chair" at the trial of this matter, Farr added the 
Trinity, Unitrin and the Jones defendants to the lawsuit and sought a declaratory 
judgment regarding their liability in this case. 
It appeared to Farr that the only potential basis for Trinity, Unitrin and Jones to 
have any fault (or liability) in relation to plaintiff would be if they breached a duty owed 
to Fan* that caused Farr damage. While Farr does believe that Trinity, Unitrin and the 
Jones defendants may have breached certain duties owed to it, those breaches of duty 
caused no harm to Farr because no loss occurred to Farr during the period when the 
Trinity policy was in force. 
Notably, no cross-claims had been asserted against Trinity, Unitrin and the Jones 
defendants in this case. As such, it appears that none of the other defendants seriously 
contend they have a direct claim against the Trinity, Unitrin and Jones defendants. 
Further, no oppositions to the motions for summary judgment have been filed by any 
other defendant in the case. Consequently, it appears that the other defendants did not 
contest the dismissal of the Trinity, Unitrin and Jones defendants. In the trial court's 
ruling, the trial court stated, "At the conclusion of the May 7th hearing the Court took all 
matters under advisement except for plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on 
apportionment which the Court indicated it would reserve until, if necessary, the time of 
trial.55 Should the appellate court remand this case to the trial court, the issue of 
apportionment should be decided by the trial court at that time. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Farr requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
determination that the "oral binder" and "policy ambiguity" claims need not be 
considered, reverse the trial court's denial of Fan*'s motion for partial summary judgment 
on the issue of liability in relation to Reed, Trustco, Safeco and Hartford, and reverse the 
trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of appellees on the basis that 
questions of material fact remain to be decided. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 1 day of January, 2008. 
sM CLHA<-<VVUL6U^ 
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Attorneys For Petitioner/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
31A-1-301. Definitions. 
As used in this title, unless otherwise specified: 
(1) (a) "Accident and health insurance" means insurance to provide protection 
against economic losses resulting from: 
(i) a medical condition including: 
(A) medical care expenses; or 
(B) the risk of disability; 
(ii) accident; or 
(iii) sickness. 
(b) "Accident and health insurance": 
(i) includes a contract with disability contingencies including: 
(A) an income replacement contract; 
(B) a health care contract; 
(C) an expense reimbursement contract; 
(D) a credit accident and health contract; 
(E) a continuing care contract; and 
(F) a long-term care contract; and 
(ii) may provide: 
(A) hospital coverage; 
(B) surgical coverage; 
(C) medical coverage; or 
(D) loss of income coverage. 
(c) "Accident and health insurance" does not include workers1 compensation 
insurance. 
(2) "Actuary" is as defined by the commissioner by rule, made in accordance 
with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(3) "Administrator" is defined in Subsection (157). 
(4) "Adult" means a natural person who has attained the age of at least 18 
years. 
(5) "Affiliate" means any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with, another person. A corporation is an affiliate of another 
corporation, regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural 
persons manages the corporations. 
(6) "Agency" means: 
(a) a person other than an individual, including a sole proprietorship by which a 
natural person does business under an assumed name; and 
(b) an insurance organization licensed or required to be licensed under Section 
31A-23a-301. 
(7) "Alien insurer" means an insurer domiciled outside the United States. 
(8) "Amendment" means an endorsement to an insurance policy or certificate. 
(9) "Annuity" means an agreement to make periodical payments for a period 
certain or over the lifetime of one or more natural persons if the making or 
continuance of all or some of the series of the payments, or the amount of the 
payment, is dependent upon the continuance of human life. 
(10) "Application" means a document: 
(a) (i) completed by an applicant to provide information about the risk to be 
insured; and 
(ii) that contains information that is used by the insurer to evaluate risk and 
decide whether to: 
(A) insure the risk under: 
(I) the coverages as originally offered; or 
(II) a modification of the coverage as originally offered; or 
(B) decline to insure the risk; or 
(b) used by the insurer to gather information from the applicant before issuance 
of an annuity contract. 
(11) "Articles" or "articles of incorporation" means the original articles, special 
laws, charters, amendments, restated articles, articles of merger or consolidation, 
trust instruments, and other constitutive documents for trusts and other entities that 
are not corporations, and amendments to any of these. 
(12) "Bail bond insurance" means a guarantee that a person will attend court 
when required, up to and including surrender of the person in execution of any 
sentence imposed under Subsection 77-20-7(1), as a condition to the release of 
that person from confinement. 
(13) "Binder" is defined in Section 31A-21-102. 
(14) "Blanket insurance policy" means a group policy covering classes of 
persons without individual underwriting, where the persons insured are determined 
by definition of the class with or without designating the persons covered. 
(15) "Board," "board of trustees," or "board of directors" means the group of 
persons with responsibility over, or management of, a corporation, however 
designated. 
(16) "Business entity" means a corporation, association, partnership, limited 
liability company, limited liability partnership, or other legal entity. 
(17) "Business of insurance" is defined in Subsection (84). 
(18) "Business plan" means the information required to be supplied to the 
commissioner under Subsections 31A-5-204(2)(i) and (j), including the 
information required when these subsections are applicable by reference under: 
(a) Section 31A-7-201; 
(b) Section 31A-8-205; or 
(c) Subsection 31A-9-205(2). 
(19) "Bylaws" means the rules adopted for the regulation or management of a 
corporation's affairs, however designated and includes comparable rules for trusts 
and other entities that are not corporations. 
(20) "Captive insurance company" means: 
(a) an insurance company: 
(i) owned by another organization; and 
(ii) whose exclusive purpose is to insure risks of the parent organization and 
affiliated companies; or 
(b) in the case of groups and associations, an insurance organization: 
(i) owned by the insureds; and 
(ii) whose exclusive purpose is to insure risks of: 
(A) member organizations; 
(B) group members; and 
(C) affiliates of: 
(I) member organizations; or 
(II) group members. 
(21) "Casualty insurance" means liability insurance as defined in Subsection 
(96). 
(22) "Certificate" means evidence of insurance given to: 
(a) an insured under a group insurance policy; or 
(b) a third party. 
(23) "Certificate of authority" is included within the term "license." 
(24) "Claim," unless the context otherwise requires, means a request or demand 
on an insurer for payment of benefits according to the terms of an insurance 
policy. 
(25) "Claims-made coverage" means an insurance contract or provision 
limiting coverage under a policy insuring against legal liability to claims that are 
first made against the insured while the policy is in force. 
(26) (a) "Commissioner" or "commissioner of insurance" means Utah's 
insurance commissioner. 
(b) When appropriate, the terms listed in Subsection (26)(a) apply to the 
equivalent supervisory official of another jurisdiction. 
(27) (a) "Continuing care insurance" means insurance that: 
(i) provides board and lodging; 
(ii) provides one or more of the following services: 
(A) personal services; 
(B) nursing services; 
(C) medical services; or 
(D) other health-related services; and 
(iii) provides the coverage described in Subsection (27)(a)(i) under an 
agreement effective: 
(A) for the life of the insured; or 
(B) for a period in excess of one year. 
(b) Insurance is continuing care insurance regardless of whether or not the 
board and lodging are provided at the same location as the services described in 
Subsection (27)(a)(ii). 
(28) (a) "Control," "controlling," "controlled," or "under common control" 
means the direct or indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction 
of the management and policies of a person. This control may be: 
(i) by contract; 
(ii) by common management; 
(iii) through the ownership of voting securities; or 
(iv) by a means other than those described in Subsections (28)(a)(i) through 
(iii). 
(b) There is no presumption that an individual holding an official position with 
another person controls that person solely by reason of the position. 
(c) A person having a contract or arrangement giving control is considered to 
have control despite the illegality or invalidity of the contract or arrangement. 
(d) There is a rebuttable presumption of control in a person who directly or 
indirectly owns, controls, holds with the power to vote, or holds proxies to vote 
10% or more of the voting securities of another person. 
(29) "Controlled insurer" means a licensed insurer that is either directly or 
indirectly controlled by a producer. 
(30) "Controlling person" means any person that directly or indirectly has the 
power to direct or cause to be directed, the management, control, or activities of a 
reinsurance intermediary. 
(31) "Controlling producer" means a producer who directly or indirectly 
controls an insurer. 
(32) (a) "Corporation" means an insurance corporation, except when referring 
to: 
(i) a corporation doing business: 
(A) as: 
(I) an insurance producer; 
(II) a limited line producer; 
(III) a consultant; 
(IV) a managing general agent; 
(V) a reinsurance intermediary; 
(VI) a third party administrator; or 
(VII) an adjuster; and 
(B) under: 
(I) Chapter 23a, Insurance Marketing - Licensing Producers, Consultants, and 
Reinsurance Intermediaries; 
(II) Chapter 25, Third Party Administrators; or 
(III) Chapter 26, Insurance Adjusters; or 
(ii) a noninsurer that is part of a holding company system under Chapter 16, 
Insurance Holding Companies. 
(b) "Stock corporation" means a stock insurance corporation. 
(c) "Mutual" or "mutual corporation" means a mutual insurance corporation. 
(33) "Creditable coverage" has the same meaning as provided in federal 
regulations adopted pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996? Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
(34) "Credit accident and health insurance" means insurance on a debtor to 
provide indemnity for payments coming due on a specific loan or other credit 
transaction while the debtor is disabled. 
(35) (a) "Credit insurance" means insurance offered in connection with an 
extension of credit that is limited to partially or wholly extinguishing that credit 
obligation. 
(b) "Credit insurance" includes: 
(i) credit accident and health insurance; 
(ii) credit life insurance; 
(iii) credit property insurance; 
(iv) credit unemployment insurance; 
(v) guaranteed automobile protection insurance; 
(vi) involuntary unemployment insurance; 
(vii) mortgage accident and health insurance; 
(viii) mortgage guaranty insurance; and 
(ix) mortgage life insurance. 
(36) "Credit life insurance" means insurance on the life of a debtor in 
connection with an extension of credit that pays a person if the debtor dies. 
(37) "Credit property insurance" means insurance: 
(a) offered in connection with an extension of credit; and 
(b) that protects the property until the debt is paid. 
(38) "Credit unemployment insurance" means insurance: 
(a) offered in connection with an extension of credit; and 
(b) that provides indemnity if the debtor is unemployed for payments coming 
due on a: 
(i) specific loan; or 
(ii) credit transaction. 
(39) "Creditor" means a person, including an insured, having any claim, 
whether: 
(a) matured; 
(b) unmatured; 
(c) liquidated; 
(d) unliquidated; 
(e) secured; 
(f) unsecured; 
(g) absolute; 
(h) fixed; or 
(i) contingent. 
(40) (a) "Customer service representative" means a person that provides 
insurance services and insurance product information: 
(i) for the customer service representative's: 
(A) producer; or 
(B) consultant employer; and 
(ii) to the customer service representative's employer's: 
(A) customer; 
(B) client; or 
(C) organization. 
(b) A customer service representative may only operate within the scope of 
authority of the customer service representative's producer or consultant employer. 
(41) "Deadline" means the final date or time: 
(a) imposed by: 
(i) statute; 
(ii) rule; or 
(iii) order; and 
(b) by which a required filing or payment must be received by the department. 
(42) "Deemer clause" means a provision under this title under which upon the 
occurrence of a condition precedent, the commissioner is deemed to have taken a 
specific action. If the statute so provides, the condition precedent may be the 
commissioner's failure to take a specific action. 
(43) "Degree of relationship" means the number of steps between two persons 
determined by counting the generations separating one person from a common 
ancestor and then counting the generations to the other person. 
(44) "Department" means the Insurance Department. 
(45) "Director" means a member of the board of directors of a corporation. 
(46) "Disability" means a physiological or psychological condition that 
partially or totally limits an individual's ability to: 
(a) perform the duties of: 
(i) that individual's occupation; or 
(ii) any occupation for which the individual is reasonably suited by education, 
training, 
or experience; or 
(b) perform two or more of the following basic activities of daily living: 
(i) eating; 
(ii) toileting; 
(iii) transferring; 
(iv) bathing; or 
(v) dressing. 
(47) "Disability income insurance" is defined in Subsection (75). 
(48) "Domestic insurer" means an insurer organized under the laws of this 
state. 
(49) "Domiciliary state" means the state in which an insurer: 
(a) is incorporated; 
(b) is organized; or 
(c) in the case of an alien insurer, enters into the United States. 
(50) (a) "Eligible employee" means: 
(i) an employee who: 
(A) works on a full-time basis; and 
(B) has a normal work week of 30 or more hours; or 
(ii) a person described in Subsection (50)(b). 
(b) "Eligible employee" includes, if the individual is included under a health 
benefit plan of a small employer: 
(i) a sole proprietor; 
(ii) a partner in a partnership; or 
(iii) an independent contractor. 
(c) "Eligible employee" does not include, unless eligible under Subsection 
(50)(b): 
(i) an individual who works on a temporary or substitute basis for a small 
employer; 
(ii) an employer's spouse; or 
(iii) a dependent of an employer. 
(51) "Employee" means any individual employed by an employer. 
(52) "Employee benefits" means one or more benefits or services provided to: 
(a) employees; or 
(b) dependents of employees. 
(53) (a) "Employee welfare fund" means a fund: 
(i) established or maintained, whether directly or through trustees, by: 
(A) one or more employers; 
(B) one or more labor organizations; or 
(C) a combination of employers and labor organizations; and 
(ii) that provides employee benefits paid or contracted to be paid, other than 
income from investments of the fund, by or on behalf of an employer doing 
business in this state or for the benefit of any person employed in this state. 
(b) "Employee welfare fund" includes a plan funded or subsidized by user fees 
or tax revenues. 
(54) "Endorsement" means a written agreement attached to a policy or 
certificate to modify one or more of the provisions of the policy or certificate. 
(55) "Enrollment date," with respect to a health benefit plan, means the first 
day of coverage or, if there is a waiting period, the first day of the waiting period. 
(56) (a) "Escrow" means: 
(i) a real estate settlement or real estate closing conducted by a third party 
pursuant to the requirements of a written agreement between the parties in a real 
estate transaction; or 
(ii) a settlement or closing involving: 
(A) a mobile home; 
(B) a grazing right; 
(C) a water right; or 
(D) other personal property authorized by the commissioner, 
(b) "Escrow" includes the act of conducting a: 
(i) real estate settlement; or 
(ii) real estate closing. 
(57) "Escrow agent" means: 
(a) an insurance producer with: 
(i) a title insurance line of authority; and 
(ii) an escrow subline of authority; or 
(b) a person defined as an escrow agent in Section 7-22-101. 
(58) "Excludes" is not exhaustive and does not mean that other things are not 
also excluded. The items listed are representative examples for use in 
interpretation of this title. 
(59) "Expense reimbursement insurance" means insurance: 
(a) written to provide payments for expenses relating to hospital confinements 
resulting from illness or injury; and 
(b) written: 
(i) as a daily limit for a specific number of days in a hospital; and 
(ii) to have a one or two day waiting period following a hospitalization. 
(60) "Fidelity insurance" means insurance guaranteeing the fidelity of persons 
holding positions of public or private trust. 
(61) (a) "Filed" means that a filing is: 
(i) submitted to the department as required by and in accordance with any 
applicable statute, rule, or filing order; 
(ii) received by the department within the time period provided in the 
applicable statute, rule, or filing order; and 
(iii) accompanied by the appropriate fee in accordance with: 
(A) Section 31A-3-103; or 
(B) rule. 
(b) "Filed" does not include a filing that is rejected by the department because it 
is not submitted in accordance with Subsection (61)(a). 
(62) "Filing," when used as a noun, means an item required to be filed with the 
department including: 
(a) a policy; 
(b) a rate; 
(c) a form; 
(d) a document; 
(e) a plan; 
(f) a manual; 
(g) an application; 
(h) a report; 
(i) a certificate; 
(j) an endorsement; 
(k) an actuarial certification; 
(1) a licensee annual statement; 
(m) a licensee renewal application; or 
(n) an advertisement. 
(63) "First party insurance" means an insurance policy or contract in which the 
insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for the insured's losses. 
(64) "Foreign insurer" means an insurer domiciled outside of this state, 
including an alien insurer. 
(65) (a) "Form" means one of the following prepared for general use: 
(i) a policy; 
(ii) a certificate; 
(iii) an application; or 
(iv) an outline of coverage. 
(b) "Form" does not include a document specially prepared for use in an 
individual case. 
(66) "Franchise insurance" means individual insurance policies provided 
through a mass marketing arrangement involving a defined class of persons related 
in some way other than through the purchase of insurance. 
(67) "General lines of authority" include: 
(a) the general lines of insurance in Subsection (68); 
(b) title insurance under one of the following sublines of authority: 
(i) search, including authority to act as a title marketing representative; 
(ii) escrow, including authority to act as a title marketing representative; 
(iii) search and escrow, including authority to act as a title marketing 
representative; and 
(iv) title marketing representative only; 
(c) surplus lines; 
(d) workers' compensation; and 
(e) any other line of insurance that the commissioner considers necessary to 
recognize in the public interest. 
(68) "General lines of insurance" include: 
(a) accident and health; 
(b) casualty; 
(c) life; 
(d) personal lines; 
(e) property; and 
(f) variable contracts, including variable life and annuity. 
(69) "Group health plan" means an employee welfare benefit plan to the extent 
that the plan provides medical care: 
(a) (i) to employees; or 
(ii) to a dependent of an employee; and 
(b) (i) directly; 
(ii) through insurance reimbursement; or 
(iii) through any other method. 
(70) (a) "Group insurance policy" means a policy covering a group of persons 
that is issued: 
(i) to a policyholder on behalf of the group; and 
(ii) for the benefit of group members who are selected under procedures 
defined in: 
(A) the policy; or 
(B) agreements which are collateral to the policy. 
(b) A group insurance policy may include members of the policyholder's family 
or dependents. 
(71) "Guaranteed automobile protection insurance" means insurance offered in 
connection with an extension of credit that pays the difference in amount between 
the insurance settlement and the balance of the loan if the insured automobile is a 
total loss. 
(72) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (72)(b), "health benefit plan" means a 
policy or certificate that: 
(i) provides health care insurance; 
(ii) provides major medical expense insurance; or 
(iii) is offered as a substitute for hospital or medical expense insurance such as: 
(A) a hospital confinement indemnity; or 
(B) a limited benefit plan. 
(b) "Health benefit plan" does not include a policy or certificate that: 
(i) provides benefits solely for: 
(A) accident; 
(B) dental; 
(C) income replacement; 
(D) long-term care; 
(E) a Medicare supplement; 
(F) a specified disease; 
(G) vision; or 
(H) a short-term limited duration; or 
(ii) is offered and marketed as supplemental health insurance. 
(73) "Health care" means any of the following intended for use in the diagnosis, 
treatment, mitigation, or prevention of a human ailment or impairment: 
(a) professional services; 
(b) personal services; 
(c) facilities; 
(d) equipment; 
(e) devices; 
(f) supplies; or 
(g) medicine. 
(74) (a) "Health care insurance" or "health insurance" means insurance 
providing: 
(i) health care benefits; or 
(ii) payment of incurred health care expenses. 
(b) "Health care insurance" or "health insurance" does not include accident and 
health insurance providing benefits for: 
(i) replacement of income; 
(ii) short-term accident; 
(iii) fixed indemnity; 
(iv) credit accident and health; 
(v) supplements to liability; 
(vi) workers' compensation; 
(vii) automobile medical payment; 
(viii) no-fault automobile; 
(ix) equivalent self-insurance; or 
(x) any type of accident and health insurance coverage that is a part of or 
attached to another type of policy. 
(75) "Income replacement insurance" or "disability income insurance" means 
insurance written to provide payments to replace income lost from accident or 
sickness. 
(76) "Indemnity" means the payment of an amount to offset all or part of an 
insured loss. 
(77) "Independent adjuster" means an insurance adjuster required to be licensed 
under Section 31A-26-201 who engages in insurance adjusting as a representative 
of insurers. 
(78) "Independently procured insurance" means insurance procured under 
Section 31A-15-104. 
(79) "Individual" means a natural person. 
(80) "Inland marine insurance" includes insurance covering: 
(a) property in transit on or over land; 
(b) property in transit over water by means other than boat or ship; 
(c) bailee liability; 
(d) fixed transportation property such as bridges, electric transmission systems, 
radio and television transmission towers and tunnels; and 
(e) personal and commercial property floaters. 
(81) "Insolvency" means that: 
(a) an insurer is unable to pay its debts or meet its obligations as they mature; 
(b) an insurer's total adjusted capital is less than the insurer's mandatory control 
level RBC under Subsection 31A-17-601(8)(c); or 
(c) an insurer is determined to be hazardous under this title. 
(82) (a) "Insurance" means: 
(i) an arrangement, contract, or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one 
or more persons to one or more other persons; or 
(ii) an arrangement, contract, or plan for the distribution of a risk or risks 
among a group of persons that includes the person seeking to distribute that 
person's risk. 
(b) "Insurance" includes: 
(i) risk distributing arrangements providing for compensation or replacement 
for damages or loss through the provision of services or benefits in kind; 
(ii) contracts of guaranty or suretyship entered into by the guarantor or surety 
as a business and not as merely incidental to a business transaction; and 
(iii) plans in which the risk does not rest upon the person who makes the 
arrangements, but with a class of persons who have agreed to share it. 
(83) "Insurance adjuster" means a person who directs the investigation, 
negotiation, or settlement of a claim under an insurance policy other than life 
insurance or an annuity, on behalf of an insurer, policyholder, or a claimant under 
an insurance policy. 
(84) "Insurance business" or "business of insurance" includes: 
(a) providing health care insurance, as defined in Subsection (74), by 
organizations that are or should be licensed under this title; 
(b) providing benefits to employees in the event of contingencies not within the 
control of the employees, in which the employees are entitled to the benefits as a 
right, which benefits may be provided either: 
(i) by single employers or by multiple employer groups; or 
(ii) through trusts, associations, or other entities; 
(c) providing annuities, including those issued in return for gifts, except those 
provided by persons specified in Subsections 31A-22-1305(2) and (3); 
(d) providing the characteristic services of motor clubs as outlined in 
Subsection (112); 
(e) providing other persons with insurance as defined in Subsection (82); 
(f) making as insurer, guarantor, or surety, or proposing to make as insurer, 
guarantor, or surety, any contract or policy of title insurance; 
(g) transacting or proposing to transact any phase of title insurance, including: 
(i) solicitation; 
(ii) negotiation preliminary to execution; 
(iii) execution of a contract of title insurance; 
(iv) insuring; and 
(v) transacting matters subsequent to the execution of the contract and arising 
out of the contract, including reinsurance; and 
(h) doing, or proposing to do, any business in substance equivalent to 
Subsections (84)(a) through (g) in a manner designed to evade the provisions of 
this title. 
(85) "Insurance consultant" or "consultant" means a person who: 
(a) advises other persons about insurance needs and coverages; 
(b) is compensated by the person advised on a basis not directly related to the 
insurance placed; and 
(c) except as provided in Section 31A-23a-501, is not compensated directly or 
indirectly by an insurer or producer for advice given. 
(86) "Insurance holding company system" means a group of two or more 
affiliated persons, at least one of whom is an insurer. 
(87) (a) "Insurance producer" or "producer" means a person licensed or 
required to be licensed under the laws of this state to sell, solicit, or negotiate 
insurance. 
(b) With regards to the selling, soliciting, or negotiating of an insurance 
product to an insurance customer or an insured: 
(i) "producer for the insurer" means a producer who is compensated directly or 
indirectly by an insurer for selling, soliciting, or negotiating any product of that 
insurer; and 
(ii) "producer for the insured" means a producer who: 
(A) is compensated directly and only by an insurance customer or an insured; 
and 
(B) receives no compensation directly or indirectly from an insurer for selling, 
soliciting, or negotiating any product of that insurer to an insurance customer or 
insured. 
(88) (a) "Insured" means a person to whom or for whose benefit an insurer 
makes a promise in an insurance policy and includes: 
(i) policyholders; 
(ii) subscribers; 
(iii) members; and 
(iv) beneficiaries. 
(b) The definition in Subsection (88)(a): 
(i) applies only to this title; and 
(ii) does not define the meaning of this word as used in insurance policies or 
certificates. 
(89) (a) (i) "Insurer" means any person doing an insurance business as a 
principal including: 
(A) fraternal benefit societies; 
(B) issuers of gift annuities other than those specified in Subsections 31A-22-
1305(2) and (3); 
(C) motor clubs; 
(D) employee welfare plans; and 
(E) any person purporting or intending to do an insurance business as a 
principal on that person's own account. 
(ii) "Insurer" does not include a governmental entity to the extent it is engaged 
in the activities described in Section 31A-12-107. 
(b) "Admitted insurer" is defined in Subsection (161)(b). 
(c) "Alien insurer" is defined in Subsection (7). 
(d) "Authorized insurer" is defined in Subsection (161)(b). 
(e) "Domestic insurer" is defined in Subsection (48). 
(f) "Foreign insurer" is defined in Subsection (64). 
(g) "Nonadmitted insurer" is defined in Subsection (161)(a). 
(h) "Unauthorized insurer" is defined in Subsection (161)(a). 
(90) "Interinsurance exchange" is defined in Subsection (141). 
(91) "Involuntary unemployment insurance" means insurance: 
(a) offered in connection with an extension of credit; 
(b) that provides indemnity if the debtor is involuntarily unemployed for 
payments coming due on a: 
(i) specific loan; or 
(ii) credit transaction. 
(92) "Large employer," in connection with a health benefit plan, means an 
employer who, with respect to a calendar year and to a plan year: 
(a) employed an average of at least 51 eligible employees on each business day 
during the preceding calendar year; and 
(b) employs at least two employees on the first day of the plan year. 
(93) "Late enrollee," with respect to an employer health benefit plan, means an 
individual whose enrollment is a late enrollment. 
(94) "Late enrollment," with respect to an employer health benefit plan, means 
enrollment of an individual other than: 
(a) on the earliest date on which coverage can become effective for the 
individual under the terms of the plan; or 
(b) through special enrollment. 
(95) (a) Except for a retainer contract or legal assistance described in Section 
31A-1-103, "legal expense insurance" means insurance written to indemnify or 
pay for specified legal expenses. 
(b) "Legal expense insurance" includes arrangements that-cr^atereasonable 
expectations 
of enforceable rights. 
(c) "Legal expense insurance" does not include the provision of, or 
reimbursement for, legal services incidental to other insurance coverages. 
(96) (a) "Liability insurance" means insurance against liability: 
(i) for death, injury, or disability of any human being, or for damage to 
property, exclusive of the coverages under: 
(A) Subsection (106) for medical malpractice insurance; 
(B) Subsection (133) for professional liability insurance; and 
(C) Subsection (166) for workers' compensation insurance; 
(ii) for medical, hospital, surgical, and funeral benefits to persons other than the 
insured who are injured, irrespective of legal liability of the insured, when issued 
with or supplemental to insurance against legal liability for the death, injury, or 
disability of human beings, exclusive of the coverages under: 
(A) Subsection (106) for medical malpractice insurance; 
(B) Subsection (133) for professional liability insurance; and 
(C) Subsection (166) for workers' compensation insurance; 
(iii) for loss or damage to property resulting from accidents to or explosions of 
boilers, pipes, pressure containers, machinery, or apparatus; 
(iv) for loss or damage to any property caused by the breakage or leakage of 
sprinklers, water pipes and containers, or by water entering through leaks or 
openings in buildings; or 
(v) for other loss or damage properly the subject of insurance not within any 
other kind or kinds of insurance as defined in this chapter, if such insurance is not 
contrary to law or public policy. 
(b) "Liability insurance" includes: 
(i) vehicle liability insurance as defined in Subsection (163); 
(ii) residential dwelling liability insurance as defined in Subsection (144); and 
(iii) making inspection of, and issuing certificates of inspection upon, elevators, 
boilers, machinery, and apparatus of any kind when done in connection with 
insurance on them. 
(97) (a) "License" means the authorization issued by the commissioner to 
engage in some activity that is part of or related to the insurance business. 
(b) "License" includes certificates of authority issued to insurers. 
(98) (a) "Life insurance" means insurance on human lives and insurances 
pertaining to or connected with human life. 
(b) The business of life insurance includes: 
(i) granting death benefits; 
(ii) granting annuity benefits; 
(iii) granting endowment benefits; 
(iv) granting additional benefits in the event of death by accident; 
(v) granting additional benefits to safeguard the policy against lapse; and 
(vi) providing optional methods of settlement of proceeds. 
(99) "Limited license" means a license that: 
(a) is issued for a specific product of insurance; and 
(b) limits an individual or agency to transact only for that product or insurance. 
(100) "Limited line credit insurance" includes the following forms of insurance: 
(a) credit life; 
(b) credit accident and health; 
(c) credit property; 
(d) credit unemployment; 
(e) involuntary unemployment; 
(f) mortgage life; 
(g) mortgage guaranty; 
(h) mortgage accident and health; 
(i) guaranteed automobile protection; and 
(j) any other form of insurance offered in connection with an extension of 
credit that: 
(i) is limited to partially or wholly extinguishing the credit obligation; and 
(ii) the commissioner determines by rule should be designated as a form of 
limited line credit insurance. 
(101) "Limited line credit insurance producer" means a person who sells, 
solicits, or negotiates one or more forms of limited line credit insurance coverage 
to individuals through a master, corporate, group, or individual policy. 
(102) "Limited line insurance" includes: 
(a) bail bond; 
(b) limited line credit insurance; 
(c) legal expense insurance; 
(d) motor club insurance; 
(e) rental car-related insurance; 
(f) travel insurance; and 
(g) any other form of limited insurance that the commissioner determines by 
rule should be designated a form of limited line insurance. 
(103) "Limited lines authority" includes: 
(a) the lines of insurance listed in Subsection (102); and 
(b) a customer service representative. 
(104) "Limited lines producer" means a person who sells, solicits, or negotiates 
limited lines insurance. 
(105) (a) "Long-term care insurance" means an insurance policy or rider 
advertised, marketed, offered, or designated to provide coverage: 
(i) in a setting other than an acute care unit of a hospital; 
(ii) for not less than 12 consecutive months for each covered person on the 
basis of: 
(A) expenses incurred; 
(B) indemnity; 
(C) prepayment; or 
(D) another method; 
(iii) for one or more necessary or medically necessary services that are: 
(A) diagnostic; 
(B) preventative; 
(C) therapeutic; 
(D) rehabilitative; 
(E) maintenance; or 
(F) personal care; and 
(iv) that may be issued by: 
(A) an insurer; 
(B) a fraternal benefit society; 
(C) (I) a nonprofit health hospital; and 
(II) a medical service corporation; 
(D) a prepaid health plan; 
(E) a health maintenance organization; or 
(F) an entity similar to the entities described in Subsections (105)(a)(iv)(A) 
through (E) to the extent that the entity is otherwise authorized to issue life or 
health care insurance. 
(b) "Long-term care insurance" includes: 
(i) any of the following that provide directly or supplement long-term care 
insurance: 
(A) a group or individual annuity or rider; or 
(B) a life insurance policy or rider; 
(ii) a policy or rider that provides for payment of benefits based on: 
(A) cognitive impairment; or 
(B) functional capacity; or 
(iii) a qualified long-term care insurance contract. 
(c) "Long-term care insurance" does not include: 
(i) a policy that is offered primarily to provide basic Medicare supplement 
coverage; 
(ii) basic hospital expense coverage; 
(iii) basic medical/surgical expense coverage; 
(iv) hospital confinement indemnity coverage; 
(v) major medical expense coverage; 
(vi) income replacement or related asset-protection coverage; 
(vii) accident only coverage; 
(viii) coverage for a specified: 
(A) disease; or 
(B) accident; 
(ix) limited benefit health coverage; or 
(x) a life insurance policy that accelerates the death benefit to provide the 
option of a lump sum payment: 
(A) if the following are not conditioned on the receipt of long-term care: 
(I) benefits; or 
(II) eligibility; and 
(B) the coverage is for one or more the following qualifying events: 
(I) terminal illness; 
(II) medical conditions requiring extraordinary medical intervention; or 
(III) permanent institutional confinement. 
(106) "Medical malpractice insurance" means insurance against legal liability 
incident to the practice and provision of medical services other than the practice 
and provision of dental services. 
(107) "Member" means a person having membership rights in an insurance 
corporation. 
(108) "Minimum capital" or "minimum required capital" means the capital that 
must be constantly maintained by a stock insurance corporation as required by 
statute. 
(109) "Mortgage accident and health insurance" means insurance offered in 
connection with an extension of credit that provides indemnity for payments 
coming due on a mortgage 
while the debtor is disabled. 
(110) "Mortgage guaranty insurance" means surety insurance under which 
mortgagees and other creditors are indemnified against losses caused by the 
default of debtors. 
(111) "Mortgage life insurance" means insurance on the life of a debtor in 
connection with an extension of credit that pays if the debtor dies. 
(112) "Motor club" means a person: 
(a) licensed under: 
(i) Chapter 5, Domestic Stock and Mutual Insurance Corporations; 
(ii) Chapter 11, Motor Clubs; or 
(iii) Chapter 14, Foreign Insurers; and 
(b) that promises for an advance consideration to provide for a stated period of 
time: 
(i) legal services under Subsection 31A-ll-102(l)(b); 
(ii) bail services under Subsection 31A-ll-102(l)(c); or 
(iii) (A) trip reimbursement; 
(B) towing services; 
(C) emergency road services; 
(D) stolen automobile services; 
(E) a combination of the services listed in Subsections (112)(b)(iii)(A) through 
(D); or 
(F) any other services given in Subsections 31A-ll-102(l)(b) through (f). 
(113) "Mutual" means a mutual insurance corporation. 
(114) "Network plan" means health care insurance: 
(a) that is issued by an insurer; and 
(b) under which the financing and delivery of medical care is provided, in 
whole or in part, through a defined set of providers under contract with the insurer, 
including the financing and delivery of items paid for as medical care. 
(115) "Nonparticipating" means a plan of insurance under which the insured is 
not entitled to receive dividends representing shares of the surplus of the insurer. 
(116) "Ocean marine insurance" means insurance against loss of or damage to: 
(a) ships or hulls of ships; 
(b) goods, freight, cargoes, merchandise, effects, disbursements, profits, 
moneys, securities, choses in action, evidences of debt, valuable papers, bottomry, 
respondentia interests, or other cargoes in or awaiting transit over the oceans or 
inland waterways; 
(c) earnings such as freight, passage money, commissions, or profits derived 
from transporting goods or people upon or across the oceans or inland waterways; 
or 
(d) a vessel owner or operator as a result of liability to employees, passengers, 
bailors, owners of other vessels, owners of fixed objects, customs or other 
authorities, or other persons in connection with maritime activity. 
(117) "Order" means an order of the commissioner. 
(118) "Outline of coverage" means a summary that explains an accident and 
health insurance policy. 
(119) "Participating" means a plan of insurance under which the insured is 
entitled to receive dividends representing shares of the surplus of the insurer. 
(120) "Participation," as used in a health benefit plan, means a requirement 
relating to the minimum percentage of eligible employees that must be enrolled in 
relation to the total number of eligible employees of an employer reduced by each 
eligible employee who voluntarily declines 
coverage under the plan because the employee has other group health care 
insurance coverage. 
(121) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, incorporated or 
unincorporated association, joint stock company, trust, limited liability company, 
reciprocal, syndicate, or any similar entity or combination of entities acting in 
concert. 
(122) "Personal lines insurance" means property and casualty insurance 
coverage sold for primarily noncommercial purposes to: 
(a) individuals; and 
(b) families. 
(123) "Plan sponsor" is as defined in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1002(16)(B). 
(124) "Plan year" means: 
(a) the year that is designated as the plan year in: 
(i) the plan document of a group health plan; or 
(ii) a summary plan description of a group health plan; 
(b) if the plan document or summary plan description does not designate a plan 
year or there is no plan document or summary plan description: 
(i) the year used to determine deductibles or limits; 
(ii) the policy year, if the plan does not impose deductibles or limits on a yearly 
basis; or 
(iii) the employer's taxable year if: 
(A) the plan does not impose deductibles or limits on a yearly basis; and 
(B) (I) the plan is not insured; or 
(II) the insurance policy is not renewed on an annual basis; or 
(c) in a case not described in Subsection (124)(a) or (b), the calendar year. 
(125) (a) "Policy" means any document, including attached endorsements and 
riders, purporting to be an enforceable contract, which memorializes in writing 
some or all of the terms of an insurance contract. 
(b) "Policy" includes a service contract issued by: 
(i) a motor club under Chapter 11, Motor Clubs; 
(ii) a service contract provided under Chapter 6a? Service Contracts; and 
(iii) a corporation licensed under: 
(A) Chapter 7, Nonprofit Health Service Insurance Corporations; or 
(B) Chapter 8, Health Maintenance Organizations and Limited Health Plans, 
(c) "Policy" does not include: 
(i) a certificate under a group insurance contract; or 
(ii) a document that does not purport to have legal effect. 
(126) "Policyholder" means the person who controls a policy, binder, or oral 
contract by ownership, premium payment, or otherwise. 
(127) "Policy illustration" means a presentation or depiction that includes 
nonguaranteed elements of a policy of life insurance over a period of years. 
(128) "Policy summary" means a synopsis describing the elements of a life 
insurance policy. 
(129) "Preexisting condition," with respect to a health benefit plan: 
(a) means a condition that was present before the effective date of coverage, 
whether or not any medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was 
recommended or received before that day; and 
(b) does not include a condition indicated by genetic information unless an 
actual 
diagnosis of the condition by a physician has been made. 
(130) (a) "Premium" means the monetary consideration for an insurance policy. 
(b) "Premium" includes, however designated: 
(i) assessments; 
(ii) membership fees; 
(iii) required contributions; or 
(iv) monetary consideration. 
(c) (i) Consideration paid to third party administrators for their services is not 
"premium." 
(ii) Amounts paid by third party administrators to insurers for insurance on the 
risks administered by the third party administrators are "premium." 
(131) "Principal officers" of a corporation means the officers designated under 
Subsection 31A-5-203(3). 
(132) "Proceedings" includes actions and special statutory proceedings. 
(133) "Professional liability insurance" means insurance against legal liability 
incident to the practice of a profession and provision of any professional services. 
(134) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (134)(b), "property insurance" 
means insurance against loss or damage to real or personal property of every kind 
and any interest in that property: 
(i) from all hazards or causes; and 
(ii) against loss consequential upon the loss or damage including vehicle 
comprehensive and vehicle physical damage coverages. 
(b) "Property insurance" does not include: 
(i) inland marine insurance as defined in Subsection (80); and 
(ii) ocean marine insurance as defined under Subsection (116). 
(135) "Qualified long-term care insurance contract" or "federally tax qualified 
long-term care insurance contract" means: 
(a) an individual or group insurance contract that meets the requirements of 
Section 7702B(b)? Internal Revenue Code; or 
(b) the portion of a life insurance contract that provides long-term care 
insurance: 
(i) (A) by rider; or 
(B) as a part of the contract; and 
(ii) that satisfies the requirements of Sections 7702B(b) and (e), Internal 
Revenue Code. 
(136) "Qualified United States financial institution" means an institution that: 
(a) is: 
(i) organized under the laws of the United States or any state; or 
(ii) in the case of a United States office of a foreign banking organization, 
licensed under the laws of the United States or any state; 
(b) is regulated, supervised, and examined by United States federal or state 
authorities having regulatory authority over banks and trust companies; and 
(c) meets the standards of financial condition and standing that are considered 
necessary and appropriate to regulate the quality of financial institutions whose 
letters of credit will be acceptable to the commissioner as determined by: 
(i) the commissioner by rule; or 
(ii) the Securities Valuation Office of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners. 
(137) (a) "Rate" means: 
(i) the cost of a given unit of insurance; or 
(ii) for property-casualty insurance, that cost of insurance per exposure unit 
either expressed as: 
(A) a single number; or 
(B) a pure premium rate, adjusted before any application of individual risk 
variations based on loss or expense considerations to account for the treatment of: 
(I) expenses; 
(II) profit; and 
(III) individual insurer variation in loss experience, 
(b) "Rate" does not include a minimum premium. 
(138) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (138)(b), "rate service organization" 
means any person who assists insurers in rate making or filing by: 
(i) collecting, compiling, and furnishing loss or expense statistics; 
(ii) recommending, making, or filing rates or supplementary rate information; 
(iii) advising about rate questions, except as an attorney giving legal advice. 
(b) "Rate service organization" does not mean: 
(i) an employee of an insurer; 
(ii) a single insurer or group of insurers under common control; 
(iii) a joint underwriting group; or 
(iv) a natural person serving as an actuarial or legal consultant. 
(139) "Rating manual" means any of the following used to determine initial and 
renewal policy premiums: 
(a) a manual of rates; 
(b) classifications; 
(c) rate-related underwriting rules; and 
(d) rating formulas that describe steps, policies, and procedures for determining 
initial and renewal policy premiums. 
(140) "Received by the department" means: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (140)(b), the date delivered to and 
stamped received by the department, whether delivered: 
(i) in person; or 
(ii) electronically; and 
(b) if delivered to the department by a delivery service, the delivery service's 
postmark date or pick-up date unless otherwise stated in: 
(i) statute; 
(ii) rule; or 
(iii) a specific filing order. 
(141) "Reciprocal" or "interinsurance exchange" means any unincorporated 
association of persons: 
(a) operating through an attorney-in-fact common to all of them; and 
(b) exchanging insurance contracts with one another that provide insurance 
coverage on each other. 
(142) "Reinsurance" means an insurance transaction where an insurer, for 
consideration, 
transfers any portion of the risk it has assumed to another insurer. In referring to 
reinsurance transactions, this title sometimes refers to: 
(a) the insurer transferring the risk as the "ceding insurer"; and 
(b) the insurer assuming the risk as the: 
(i) "assuming insurer"; or 
(ii) "assuming reinsurer." 
(143) "Reinsurer" means any person licensed in this state as an insurer with the 
authority to assume reinsurance. 
(144) "Residential dwelling liability insurance" means insurance against 
liability resulting from or incident to the ownership, maintenance, or use of a 
residential dwelling that is a detached single family residence or multifamily 
residence up to four units. 
(145) "Retrocession" means reinsurance with another insurer of a liability 
assumed under a reinsurance contract. A reinsurer "retrocedes" when it reinsures 
with another insurer part of a liability assumed under a reinsurance contract. 
(146) "Rider" means an endorsement to: 
(a) an insurance policy; or 
(b) an insurance certificate. 
(147) (a) "Security" means any: 
(i) note; 
(ii) stock; 
(hi) bond; 
(iv) debenture; 
(v) evidence of indebtedness; 
(vi) certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement; 
(vii) collateral-trust certificate; 
(viii) preorganization certificate or subscription; 
(ix) transferable share; 
(x) investment contract; 
(xi) voting trust certificate; 
(xii) certificate of deposit for a security; 
(xiii) certificate of interest of participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease 
or in payments out of production under such a title or lease; 
(xiv) commodity contract or commodity option; 
(xv) certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate 
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of 
the items listed in Subsections (147)(a)(i) through (xiv); or 
(xvi) other interest or instrument commonly known as a security. 
(b) "Security" does not include: 
(i) any of the following under which an insurance company promises to pay 
money in a specific lump sum or periodically for life or some other specified 
period: 
(A) insurance; 
(B) endowment policy; or 
(C) annuity contract; or 
(ii) a burial certificate or burial contract. 
(148) "Self-insurance" means any arrangement under which a person provides 
for 
spreading its own risks by a systematic plan. 
(a) Except as provided in this Subsection (148), "self-insurance" does not 
include an arrangement under which a number of persons spread their risks among 
themselves. 
(b) "Self-insurance" includes: 
(i) an arrangement by which a governmental entity undertakes to indemnify its 
employees for liability arising out of the employees' employment; and 
(ii) an arrangement by which a person with a managed program of self-
insurance and risk management undertakes to indemnify its affiliates, subsidiaries, 
directors, officers, or employees for liability or risk which is related to the 
relationship or employment. 
(c) "Self-insurance" does not include any arrangement with independent 
contractors. 
(149) "Sell" means to exchange a contract of insurance: 
(a) by any means; 
(b) for money or its equivalent; and 
(c) on behalf of an insurance company. 
(150) "Short-term care insurance" means any insurance policy or rider 
advertised, marketed, offered, or designed to provide coverage that is similar to 
long-term care insurance but that provides coverage for less than 12 consecutive 
months for each covered person. 
(151) "Significant break in coverage" means a period of 63 consecutive days 
during each of which an individual does not have any creditable coverage. 
(152) "Small employer," in connection with a health benefit plan, means an 
employer who, with respect to a calendar year and to a plan year: 
(a) employed an average of at least two employees but not more than 50 
eligible employees on each business day during the preceding calendar year; and 
(b) employs at least two employees on the first day of the plan year. 
(153) "Special enrollment period," in connection with a health benefit plan, has 
the same meaning as provided in federal regulations adopted pursuant to the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936. 
(154) (a) "Subsidiary" of a person means an affiliate controlled by that person 
either directly or indirectly through one or more affiliates or intermediaries. 
(b) "Wholly owned subsidiary" of a person is a subsidiary of which all of the 
voting shares are owned by that person either alone or with its affiliates, except for 
the minimum number of shares the law of the subsidiary's domicile requires to be 
owned by directors or others. 
(155) Subject to Subsection (82)(b), "surety insurance" includes: 
(a) a guarantee against loss or damage resulting from failure of principals to 
pay or perform their obligations to a creditor or other obligee; 
(b) bail bond insurance; and 
(c) fidelity insurance. 
(156) (a) "Surplus" means the excess of assets over the sum of paid-in capital 
and liabilities. 
(b) (i) "Permanent surplus" means the surplus of a mutual insurer that has been 
designated by the insurer as permanent. 
(ii) Sections 31A-5-211,31A-7-201, 31A-8-209, 31A-9-209, and 31A-14-209 
require that mutuals doing business in this state maintain specified minimum 
levels of permanent surplus. 
(iii) Except for assessable mutuals, the minimum permanent surplus 
requirement is 
essentially the same as the minimum required capital requirement that applies to 
stock insurers. 
(c) "Excess surplus" means: 
(i) for life or accident and health insurers, health organizations, and property 
and casualty insurers as defined in Section 31A-17-601, the lesser of: 
(A) that amount of an insurer's or health organization's total adjusted capital, as 
defined in Subsection (159), that exceeds the product of: 
(I) 2.5; and 
(II) the sum of the insurer's or health organization's minimum capital or 
permanent surplus required under Section 31A-5-211, 31A-9-209, or 31A-14-205; 
or 
(B) that amount of an insurer's or health organization's total adjusted capital, as 
defined in Subsection (159), that exceeds the product of: 
(I) 3.0; and 
(II) the authorized control level RBC as defined in Subsection 31A-17-
601(8)(a); and 
(ii) for monoline mortgage guaranty insurers, financial guaranty insurers, and 
title insurers, that amount of an insurer's paid-in-capital and surplus that exceeds 
the product of: 
(A) 1.5; and 
(B) the insurer's total adjusted capital required by Subsection 31A-17-609(1). 
(157) "Third party administrator" or "administrator" means any person who 
collects charges or premiums from, or who, for consideration, adjusts or settles 
claims of residents of the state in connection with insurance coverage, annuities, or 
service insurance coverage, except: 
(a) a union on behalf of its members; 
(b) a person administering any: 
(i) pension plan subject to the federal Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974; 
(ii) governmental plan as defined in Section 414(d), Internal Revenue Code; or 
(iii) nonelecting church plan as described in Section 410(d), Internal Revenue 
Code; 
(c) an employer on behalf of the employer's employees or the employees of one 
or more of the subsidiary or affiliated corporations of the employer; 
(d) an insurer licensed under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14, but only for a line of 
insurance for which the insurer holds a license in this state; or 
(e) a person: 
(i) licensed or exempt from licensing under: 
(A) Chapter 23a, Insurance Marketing - Licensing Producers, Consultants, and 
Reinsurance Intermediaries; or 
(B) Chapter 26, Insurance Adjusters; and 
(ii) whose activities are limited to those authorized under the license the person 
holds or for which the person is exempt. 
(158) "Title insurance" means the insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying of 
owners of real or personal property or the holders of liens or encumbrances on that 
property, or others interested in the property against loss or damage suffered by 
reason of liens or encumbrances upon, defects in, or the unmarketability of the 
title to the property, or invalidity or unenforceability of any liens or encumbrances 
on the property. 
(159) "Total adjusted capital" means the sum of an insurer's or health 
organization's statutory capital and surplus as determined in accordance with: 
(a) the statutory accounting applicable to the annual financial statements 
required to be 
filed under Section 31A-4-113; and 
(b) any other items provided by the RBC instructions, as RBC instructions is 
defined in Section 31A-17-601. 
(160) (a) "Trustee" means "director" when referring to the board of directors of 
a corporation. 
(b) "Trustee," when used in reference to an employee welfare fund, means an 
individual, firm, association, organization, joint stock company, or corporation, 
whether acting individually or jointly and whether designated by that name or any 
other, that is charged with or has the overall management of an employee welfare 
fund. 
(161) (a) "Unauthorized insurer," "unadmitted insurer," or "nonadmitted 
insurer" means an insurer: 
(i) not holding a valid certificate of authority to do an insurance business in this 
state; or 
(ii) transacting business not authorized by a valid certificate. 
(b) "Admitted insurer" or "authorized insurer" means an insurer: 
(i) holding a valid certificate of authority to do an insurance business in this 
state; and 
(ii) transacting business as authorized by a valid certificate. 
(162) "Underwrite" means the authority to accept or reject risk on behalf of the 
insurer. 
(163) "Vehicle liability insurance" means insurance against liability resulting 
from or incident to ownership, maintenance, or use of any land vehicle or aircraft, 
exclusive of vehicle comprehensive and vehicle physical damage coverages under 
Subsection (134). 
(164) "Voting security" means a security with voting rights, and includes any 
security convertible into a security with a voting right associated with the security. 
(165) "Waiting period" for a health benefit plan means the period that must 
pass before coverage for an individual, who is otherwise eligible to enroll under 
the terms of the health benefit plan, can become effective. 
(166) "Workers' compensation insurance" means: 
(a) insurance for indemnification of employers against liability for 
compensation based on: 
(i) compensable accidental injuries; and 
(ii) occupational disease disability; 
(b) employer's liability insurance incidental to workers' compensation insurance 
and written in connection with workers' compensation insurance; and 
(c) insurance assuring to the persons entitled to workers' compensation benefits 
the compensation provided by law. 
31A-21-102. Oral contracts of insurance and binders. 
(1) "Binder" means a writing which describes the subject and amount of 
insurance and temporarily binds insurance coverage pending the issuance of an 
insurance policy. "Binder" does not include conditional receipts by life insurance 
companies under which issuance of the policy or coverage under the policy is 
contingent upon the acceptability of the risk to the insurer. 
(2) Binding oral contracts of insurance may only be made as to casualty 
insurance, liability insurance, property insurance, vehicle liability insurance, 
workers' compensation insurance, and as to combinations of these coverages. The 
insurer shall issue a policy or binder as soon as reasonably possible after 
negotiation of any oral contract under this subsection. 
(3) No binder is valid beyond the issuance of the policy as to which the binder 
was given, or beyond 150 days from the binder's effective date, whichever occurs 
first. 
(4) If a policy has not been issued as to a binder, the binder may be extended or 
renewed beyond 150 days, but only upon the commissioner's written approval, or 
under rules adopted by the commissioner. 
(5) A binder may be cancelled by the insurer prior to its expiration date only in 
the same manner as and subject to the same restrictions that apply to insurance 
policies under Section 31A-21-303. 
31A-23a-402. Unfair marketing practices -- Communication — 
Inducement — Unfair discrimination — Coercion or intimidation — 
Restriction on choice. 
(1) (a) (i) Any of the following may not make or cause to be made any 
communication that contains false or misleading information, relating to an 
insurance product or contract, any insurer, or any licensee under this title, 
including information that is false or misleading because it is incomplete: 
(A) a person who is or should be licensed under this title; 
(B) an employee or producer of a person described in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A); 
(C) a person whose primary interest is as a competitor of a person licensed 
under this title; and 
(D) a person on behalf of any of the persons listed in this Subsection (l)(a)(i). 
(ii) As used in this Subsection (1), "false or misleading information1' includes: 
(A) assuring the nonobligatory payment of future dividends or refunds of 
unused premiums in any specific or approximate amounts, but reporting fully and 
accurately past experience is not false or misleading information; and 
(B) with intent to deceive a person examining it: 
(I) filing a report; 
(II) making a false entry in a record; or 
(III) wilfully refraining from making a proper entry in a record, 
(iii) A licensee under this title may not: 
(A) use any business name, slogan, emblem, or related device that is 
misleading or likely to cause the insurer or other licensee to be mistaken for 
another insurer or other licensee already in business; or 
(B) use any advertisement or other insurance promotional material that would 
cause a reasonable person to mistakenly believe that a state or federal government 
agency: 
(1) is responsible for the insurance sales activities of the person; 
(II) stands behind the credit of the person; 
(III) guarantees any returns on insurance products of or sold by the person; or 
(IV) is a source of payment of any insurance obligation of or sold by the 
person. 
(iv) A person who is not an insurer may not assume or use any name that 
deceptively implies or suggests that person is an insurer. 
(v) A person other than persons licensed as health maintenance organizations 
under Chapter 8 may not use the term "Health Maintenance Organization" or 
"HMO" in referring to itself. 
(b) A licensee's violation creates a rebuttable presumption that the violation 
was also committed by the insurer if: 
(i) the licensee under this title distributes cards or documents, exhibits a sign, or 
publishes an advertisement that violates Subsection (l)(a), with reference to a 
particular insurer: 
(A) that the licensee represents; or 
(B) for whom the licensee processes claims; and 
(ii) the cards, documents, signs, or advertisements are supplied or approved by 
that insurer. 
(2) (a) (i) A licensee under this title, or an officer or employee of a licensee 
may not induce any person to enter into or continue an insurance contract or to 
terminate an existing insurance contract by offering benefits not specified in the 
policy to be issued or continued, 
including premium or commission rebates. 
(ii) An insurer may not make or knowingly allow any agreement of insurance 
that is not clearly expressed in the policy to be issued or renewed. 
(iii) This Subsection (2)(a) does not preclude: 
(A) an insurer from reducing premiums because of expense savings; 
(B) an insurer from providing to a policyholder or insured one or more 
incentives to participate in programs or activities designed to reduce claims or 
claim expenses; 
(C) the usual kinds of social courtesies not related to particular transactions; or 
(D) an insurer from receiving premiums under an installment payment plan, 
(iv) The commissioner may adopt rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, to define what constitutes an incentive 
described in Subsection (2)(a)(iii)(B). 
(b) A licensee under this title may not absorb the tax under Section 31A-3-301. 
(c) (i) A title insurer or producer or any officer or employee of either may not 
pay, allow, give, or offer to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly, as an 
inducement to obtaining any title insurance business: 
(A) any rebate, reduction, or abatement of any rate or charge made incident to 
the issuance of the title insurance; 
(B) any special favor or advantage not generally available to others; or 
(C) any money or other consideration, except if approved under Section 31A-2-
405; or 
(D) material inducement. 
(ii) "Charge made incident to the issuance of the title insurance11 includes 
escrow charges, and any other services that are prescribed in rule by the Title and 
Escrow Commission after consultation with the commissioner and subject to 
Section 31A-2-404. 
(iii) An insured or any other person connected, directly or indirectly, with the 
transaction, including a mortgage lender, real estate broker, builder, attorney, or 
any officer, employee, or agent of any of them, may not knowingly receive or 
accept, directly or indirectly, any benefit referred to in Subsection (2)(c)(i). 
(3) (a) An insurer may not unfairly discriminate among policyholders by 
charging different premiums or by offering different terms of coverage, except on 
the basis of classifications related to the nature and the degree of the risk covered 
or the expenses involved. 
(b) Rates are not unfairly discriminatory if they are averaged broadly among 
persons insured under a group, blanket, or franchise policy, and the terms of those 
policies are not unfairly discriminatory merely because they are more favorable 
than in similar individual policies. 
(4) (a) This Subsection (4) applies to: 
(i) a person who is or should be licensed under this title; 
(ii) an employee of that licensee or person who should be licensed; 
(iii) a person whose primary interest is as a competitor of a person licensed 
under this title; and 
(iv) one acting on behalf of any person described in Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
through (iii). 
(b) A person described in Subsection (4)(a) may not commit or enter into any 
agreement to participate in any act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation that: 
(i) tends to produce: 
(A) an unreasonable restraint of the business of insurance; or 
(B) a monopoly in that business; or 
(ii) results in an applicant purchasing or replacing an insurance contract. 
(5) (a) (i) Subject to Subsection (5)(a)(ii), a person may not restrict in the 
choice of an insurer or licensee under this chapter, another person who is required 
to pay for insurance as a condition for the conclusion of a contract or other 
transaction or for the exercise of any right under a contract. 
(ii) A person requiring coverage may reserve the right to disapprove the insurer 
or the coverage selected on reasonable grounds. 
(b) The form of corporate organization of an insurer authorized to do business 
in this state is not a reasonable ground for disapproval, and the commissioner may 
by rule specify additional grounds that are not reasonable. This Subsection (5) 
does not bar an insurer from declining an application for insurance. 
(6) A person may not make any charge other than insurance premiums and 
premium financing charges for the protection of property or of a security interest 
in property, as a condition for obtaining, renewing, or continuing the financing of 
a purchase of the property or the lending of money on the security of an interest in 
the property. 
(7) (a) A licensee under this title may not refuse or fail to return promptly all 
indicia of agency to the principal on demand. 
(b) A licensee whose license is suspended, limited, or revoked under Section 
31A-2-308, 31A-23a-lll, or 31A-23a-112 may not refuse or fail to return the 
license to the commissioner on demand. 
(8) (a) A person may not engage in any other unfair method of competition or 
any other unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance, as 
defined by the commissioner by rule, after a finding that they: 
(i) are misleading; 
(ii) are deceptive; 
(iii) are unfairly discriminatory; 
(iv) provide an unfair inducement; or 
(v) unreasonably restrain competition. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (8)(a), for purpose of the title insurance 
industry, the Title and Escrow Commission shall make rules, subject to Section 
31A-2-404, that define any other unfair method of competition or any other unfair 
or deceptive act or practice after a finding that they: 
(i) are misleading; 
(ii) are deceptive; 
(iii) are unfairly discriminatory; 
(iv) provide an unfair inducement; or 
(v) unreasonably restrain competition. 
31A-23a-405. Insurer liability. 
(1) As used in this section, "insurer" includes bail bond surety companies as 
defined in Section 31A-35-102. 
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that every insurer is bound by any act of 
its appointed licensee performed in this state that is within the scope of the 
appointed licensee's actual (express or implied) or apparent authority, until the 
insurer has canceled the appointed licensee's appointment and has made 
reasonable efforts to recover from the appointed licensee its policy forms and 
other indicia of agency. Reasonable efforts include a formal demand in writing for 
return of the indicia, and notice to the commissioner if the appointed licensee does 
not promptly comply with the demand. This Subsection (2) neither waives any 
common law defense available to insurers, nor precludes the insured from seeking 
redress against the appointed licensee individually or jointly against the insurer 
and licensee. 
(3) When a licensee under this chapter with authority to bind more than one 
insurer on a particular risk agrees to bind coverage on a particular risk, but fails to 
outwardly indicate the insurer with which the risk is placed, and before the risk is 
placed with a particular insurer a loss occurs, if there is no conclusive admissible 
evidence indicating the insurer with which the licensee exercised his binding 
authority, a court may equitably apportion the loss among all insurers with which 
the licensee had binding authority as to the particular type of risk. 
31A-26-303. Unfair claim settlement practices. 
(1) No insurer or person representing an insurer may engage in any unfair claim 
settlement practice under Subsections (2), (3), and (4). 
(2) Each of the following acts is an unfair claim settlement practice: 
(a) knowingly misrepresenting material facts or the contents of insurance 
policy provisions at issue in connection with a claim under an insurance contract; 
however, this provision does not include the failure to disclose information; 
(b) attempting to use a policy application which was altered by the insurer 
without notice to, or knowledge, or consent of, the insured as the basis for settling 
or refusing to settle a claim; or 
(c) failing to settle a claim promptly under one portion of the insurance policy 
coverage, where liability and the amount of loss are reasonably clear, in order to 
influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage, but 
this Subsection (2) (c) applies only to claims made by persons in direct privity of 
contract with the insurer. 
(3) Each of the following is an unfair claim settlement practice if committed or 
performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice by an 
insurer or persons representing an insurer: 
(a) failing to acknowledge and act promptly upon communications about 
claims under insurance policies; 
(b) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt 
investigation and processing of claims under insurance policies; 
(c) compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an 
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately 
recovered in actions brought by those insureds when the amounts claimed were 
reasonably near to the amounts recovered; 
(d) failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon 
request by them, of the coverage under which payment was made; 
(e) failing to promptly provide to the insured a reasonable explanation of the 
basis for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement; 
(f) appealing from substantially all arbitration awards in favor of insureds for 
the purpose of compelling them to accept settlements or compromises for less than 
the amount awarded in arbitration; 
(g) delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, 
claimant, or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report and then 
requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms which contain 
substantially the same information; or 
(h) not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable 
settlement of claims in which liability is reasonably clear. 
(4) The commissioner may define by rule, acts or general business practices 
which are unfair claim settlement practices, after a finding that those practices are 
misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory, overreaching, or an unreasonable 
restraint on competition. 
(5) This section does not create any private cause of action. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or 
any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for 
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is 
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, 
the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what 
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are 
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this 
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
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RULING 
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JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
On May 4, 2007, the Court heard oral arguments on: (1) Defendant Hartford Steam 
Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) 
Defendant Safeco Insurance Company of America and American States Insurance 
Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; and (3) Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment against defendants Hartford and Safeco. 
On May 7, 2007, the Court heard oral arguments on the remaining motions, 
including: (1) Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint; 
(2) Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On Apportionment; (3) 
Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Safeco 
Insurance Company, American States Insurance Co., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and 
Insurance Co., Andrew L. Reed, and Trustco Inc. On Liability Issues; (4) Defendant Auto 
Owners Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; (5) Defendant Trustco's 
Motion For Summary Judgment; (6) Defendants Stephen D. Kirchen, Central Bonds & 
Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance Company Incorporated's Motion 
For Summary Judgment; and (7) Defendants Truck Insurance Exchange and Andrew 
Reed's, MQtiopi Fq>f Surrimacy Judgment. At the conclusion of thp May 7th hearing/the Court 
took a]! iP;9t|gr;§ u p ^ motfon for summary }yd;gmBn 
a f ^ r f j g ^ -it]wpujfiT fef|p/e ;untft if fteeiesp^t^|hlCtfR^Qf 
This case contains a somewhat lengthy and relatively complex factual background. 
For that reason, a brief synopsis of the undisputed facts is warranted. 
Plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Company ("Farr") is a locally based ice cream 
manufacturer and distributor in operation since incorporation in 1920. Farr's current lawsuit 
stems from an incident which occurred on May 29, 2003, at the company's cold storage 
warehouse located in Salt Lake City, Utah. On that date an electric condenser fan 
accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia line, thereby releasing 
ammonia and contaminating plaintiffs product stored at the warehouse. As of November 
7, 2003, Farr calculated damages exceeding $1,500,000.00. 
Immediately after the accident, Farr notified its insurer, American States Insurance 
Company ("American States"), of the loss. Pursuant to the Equipment Breakdown 
Coverage portion of the policy, American States paid Farr $25,000.00—the policy limit for 
ammonia contamination. Finding coverage insufficient for the loss suffered, Farr filed its 
current action against the fifteen named defendants alleging causes of action against each 
for breach pf contract, bad faith, negligence, and promissory estoppel 
From May. 14, 20Q2, tQ May 14. 29Q& Plaintiff Asael Farr_& Sons Farr was insured 
^CQjj&rty Qtf<j;liJafeiJity; ins^ranpt^o^gh Uijitrin Property-^ Casualty Group 
Insurance Group ("Farmers"), in order to obtain comprehensive property and liability 
coverage. Thereafter, Farmers' declined coverage on the Farr policy, and Reed began 
contacting other agents and insurers. In March 2003, Reed contacted Steven Kirchen 
("Kirchen") of Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Central Bonds"). At Reed's 
request, Kirchen contacted other agents and insurers and eventually obtained a bid from 
Auto Owners Insurance Company ("Auto Owners"). Auto Owners indicated, however, that 
any writing on the Farr policy was subject to office approval and additional insurer 
information on items such as loss history and property valuations. 
On May 14, 2003, Farr delivered a check to Auto Owners in the amount of 
$7,838.83 for property, liability and equipment breakdown coverages. Shortly thereafter, 
Auto Owners' underwriting department declined coverage on the Farr account and returned 
the Farr's uncashed check. 
On May 23, 2003, in a continued attempt to obtain coverage, Kirchen put Reed in 
contact with Troy Granger of Trustco Inc. ("Trustco"). Relying upon Reed's instructions, 
Farr appointed Trustco as its Broker of Record, thereby giving Trustco the authority 
necessary to handle affairs associated with writing th§ Farr poljcy. Shortly thereafter, 
Trustco.placed Fa/r's coverage with American States, anaffijjatj of Safepo Insurance 
D^napAhy fSMec^'j^nid American S t ^ 
Exchange, Trustco, Safeco, American States Insurance, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
and Insurance Co , Steve Kirchen, Central Bonds and Insurance Incorporated and Auto 
Owners Insurance Each of Farr's causes of action stem from the so-called 'Reed's 
Commitment" in which Farr alleges that Reed bound the primary defendants for all of Farr's 
insurable risks Specifically, Farr claims on and before May 14, 2003, Andrew Reed, 
while acting both for himself and as the duly authorized agent for TIE, 
Trustco, Safeco, American, Hartford, Kirchen, Cential Agency, 
Central Bonds and Auto Owners ("Primary Defendants") had received 
payment for and affirmatively represented to plaintiff (a) that 
the Primary Defendants had duly bound and provided plaintiff with all 
necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for
 cill of plaintiffs 
significant insurable risks, including all insurable risks related to Plaintiff's 
Products, and (b) that the Pnmary Defendants, and e-ach, of them had 
agreed, committed, and become jointly obligated to piovide plaintiff 
with all such necessary, available and appropriate insurance 
coverage for all of Plaintiffs Products and all of plaintiffs significant 
insurable risks ('Reeds Commitment") effective May 14, 2003 
Third Amended Complaint, If 21 
Pending Motions 
A. Plainfiff Farr's M<|tiop For Leave To File Fc 
Farr's jyiotlcp p0rL§aypTg> PlJp Fourth ^ nri%nj|0d f 
'/Travelers gQilef E^pmss £Tca\ 
Tl3O^lgRiis31%tl'!Mw0^ disc 
Company Incorporated oppose amendment, arguing that adding Travelers as a party 
would be futil#. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be "freely 
given when justice so requires." Justice, however, does not require that leave be given 
"if doing so would be futile." IHC v Jensen 2003 UT 51, ^  139, 82 P.3d 1076, citing, 
Benton v Adams 56 P.3d 81, 86 (Colo 2002) (internal citations omitted)). 
A reading of Stephen Kirchen's deposition, reveals that Kirchen did not represent 
that Travelers bound coverage. Instead, Kirchen testified that Travelers had merely issued 
a spoilage and equipment breakdown quote which was contingent upon Farr's submission 
of additional information (e.g. mortgages, loss payees, address/contact names for 
inspection). Stephen Kirchen Deposition, at 66-67. None of the additional information 
was ever provided. Moreover, Travelers' quote was a supplement to a potential policy from 
Auto Owners. Kirchen Deposition at 66. As a result, when Auto-Owners declined to write 
coverage for Farr, the Travelers portion of the proposed coverage was declined as well. 
Kirchen Deposition at 68. 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
On December 31, 2000, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company 
("Hartford") entered into a reinsurance agreement with Safeco Insurance Company of 
America ("Safeco"), under which Hartford agreed to reinsure 100% of the Equipment 
Breakdown liability policies issued by Safeco and its affiliates. At the time of the ammonia 
accident at Farr's storage warehouse, American States, an affiliate of Safeco, was Farr's 
insurer. Apparently in its role as reinsurer for Safeco, Farr now brings claims against 
Hartford for breach of contract, negligence, bad faith and equitable estoppel. The basis 
for each of Farr's causes of action is "Reed's Commitment"—the claim that Andrew Reed, 
while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for Hartford, represented to plaintiff that Hartford 
bound coverage for all of Farr's products and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint, 
at If 21. 
Farr has no contractual relationship with Hartford. As a result, all of Farr's causes 
of action against defendant stem from an alleged agency relationship between Reed and 
Hartford under which Reed, as Hartford's agent, acted on behalf of and subject to 
Hartford's contro: * ' * the record contains no evidence ot an agency 
relationship between Regd and Hartford. To be an agpnt, a person "nnugt be ^uthprizg^ 
by another t p ^ f OH h j s behajf and Subject t© fijs fagHtroh^ G j j ' d^ QklPf 
Reed Deposition, at 398. Absent evidence of an agency relationship, Farr's claims against 
Hartford for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and estoppel all fail. 
Accordingly, Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Hartford is 
denied and Hartford's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
C. Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Kirchen and Central 
Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance 
Company Incorporated And Defendants Stephen Kirchen, Central 
Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance 
Company Incorporated^ Motion For Summary Judgment 
As an initial matter, in its opposition to defendants' motion, Farr fails to effectively 
dispute and support with contrary evidence defendant Central Bonds and Insurance 
Company Incorporated's claim that it had no involvement in the events at issue in this 
litigation. Accordingly, defendant Central Bonds and Insurance Company Inc.'s Motion For 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
through Kirchen, bound coverage for all of Parr's products and insurable risks. Third 
Amended Complaint, a t f l21. 
Farr has no contractual relationship with Kirchen or Central Bonds. Consequently, 
all of Farr's causes of action against defendant stem from an alleged agency relationship 
between Reed and Kirchen and Reed and Central Bonds, under which Reed, as 
defendants' agent, acted on their behalf and subject to Kirchen and Central Bonds' control. 
Contrary to plaintiffs theory, the record contains no evidence of an agency relationship 
between Reed and Kirchen and Reed and Hartford. There is, however, no evidence of an 
agency relationship between Reed and Kirchen or Reed and Central Bonds. To be an 
agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his 
control'" Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of Utah. 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998)( citing, 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Here, to Ihe contrary, Reed expressly 
denies that he was an agent of either Kirchen or Central Bonds. Second Andrew Reed 
Deposition, at 399-400. Absent evidence of an agency relationship, Farr's claims against 
Kirchen and Central Bonds for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and estoppel all 
toil 
Plaintiff* Parr'sMotion For,Partial/pUffi;!33|^ Judgment acpinst defendants Kjrphen 
->nd QQh!M!;ftcnds is d ^ n l l ^ a ^ S M S " alt^iSrQh^^l^lJio^'Por %r|imar|t 
ie|it ( i ^ n t ^ v ^ - ^ y | k cv^V * - ; > ^ ^ ^v ":: v v-*^\ >\^" ; iv.C<:" 
of defendant Trustee, Inc ("Trustee"). On May 23, 2003, Trustco successfuily bound Parr's 
property, liability and equipment breakdown coverage with Safeco/American States 
Insurance ('American States") through a policy active from May 23, 2003, through May 23, 
2004. Six days later, on May 29, 2003, the ammonia accident occurred at the Farr 
warehouse. 
Farr's American States policy contained a $25,000.00 Equipment Breakdown 
Coverage provision for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination from the release 
of ammonia. Consequently, after the ammonia leak at Farr cold storage warehouse, 
American States paid Farr the policy limit. 
The basis for each of Farr's causes of action against American States is "Reed's 
Commitment"-the claim that Andrew Reed, while acting as the "duly authorized agent" for 
American States represented that American States bound coverage on all of plaintiffs 
products and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint, at 1] 21. 
to evaluate and ascertain the insurable risks of each insured. Finally, as to Fair's estoppel 
claim, despite absence of any agency relationship with Reed, there is no evidence that 
American States made an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the coverage it 
ultimately provided to the Farrs. 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment is denied and Defendants 
Safeco/American States' Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
E. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Auto 
Owners Insurance Company & Auto Owners Insurance Company's 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
In early May 2003, Stephen Kirchen via use of Auto Owners' computer rating 
program created a proposed premium rate for Farr's coverage. On May 13, 2003, Kirchen 
provided the rate information to Auto Owners and underwriting informed him that final 
decision on the coverage was contingent upon home office approval and additional 
application information. 
On May 14,2003, Andrew Reed asked Dexter Farr to prepare a check for $7,838.83 
payable to Auto Owners for property, liability and equipment breakdown coverage. Several 
days later, Kirchen received a call from Auto Owners1 underwriting, informing him that the 
home office declined coverage on the Farr accent Farr'g^tfhcashed.check tfia.de pgy^ble 
nm§ yyis retumed-tfi) Farr. 
causes of action against the defendant stem from an alleged agency relationship between 
Reed and Auto Owners underwhich Reed, as Auto Owners' agent acted on behalf of and 
subject to Auto Owners' control Despite Farr's theory, the record contains no evidence 
of an agency relationship between Auto Owners and Reed In Utah, in order to be an 
agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his 
control Gildea v Guardian Title Co of Utah 970 P 2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1989) (citing, 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)) Here, it is undisputed that Andrew Reed 
was not authorized to act on behalf of Auto Owners In his deposition Reed specifically 
states that he was not an agent of Auto Owners and never had authority to represent the 
company Andrew Reed Deposition, at 351-52 Absent evidence of an agency 
relationship, Farr's claims against Auto Owners for breach of contract, bad faith, 
negligence and estoppel must fail 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment against Auto Owners is 
denied, and defendant Auto Owners Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
F. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Truck 
Insurance Exchange and Andrew Reed & Truck Insurance Exchange 
and Andrew Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment 
1. Truck Insurance Exchange/Farmers Insurance 
Tuctk Insurance 
\geme?ani 
with all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for all of plaintiffs significant 
insurable risks." Third Amended Complaint fl 21. 
Despite the existence of an agency relationship between Farmers and Reed, it is 
undisputed that Farmers declined to write coverage for Farr's business, and that as early 
as May 23, 2003, Farr knew that Farmers declined coverage. Dexter Farr Deposition, at 
158-59. Thus, the agency relationship between Reed and Farmers was solely limited to 
Reed's attempt to place Farr's coverage with Farmers; once Farmers declined, Reed was 
no longer Farmer's agent and Farmers was not involved with Reed's attempts to secure 
coverage through other insurers . Thus, as to its contract based claims Farr admits it did 
not have a contract with Farmers and has not provided evidence of any acts to the 
contrary. Additionally, in support of its estoppel claim Farr has not provided any evidence 
of an admission, statement or act inconsistent with Farmers' declination of coverage prior 
to the accident. Finally, Farr's negligence claim also fails because plaintiff fails to establish 
any duty that Farmers' owed to Farr and did not fulfill. 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Truqk LnsuranQe 
Exphange/Farmers' Insurance Is dejiied and Defendant Truck Insurancp 
Exqhangeiltgrmers' Insurance Motion Fer Symmary Jitdgmighti§;f ranteil 
2: AWsteetv ReioL 
the issue is whether the coverage obtained by Reed was sufficient to meet plaintiffs 
needs, or whether Reed contracted for adequate coverage of all significant insurable risks. 
Third Amended Complaint fi 27. Albrecht is, however, helpful insofar as it addresses 
basic contract principles relevant to insurance contracts, including the rule that an agent 
must have definite directions from the insured as to the type and amount of coverage 
needed in order to establish the requisite meeting of the minds. Albrecht at fl11 (finding, 
failure to procure insurance does not arise unless agent has "definite directions from the 
insured to consummate a final contract"). In the instant case the undisputed facts 
establish that Reed obtained a policy of insurance containing coverage similar to Farr's 
prior policy with Unitrin, and that Farr did not provide Reed with any specific direction to 
acquire additional coverage beyond that previous obtained. In fact to the contrary, the 
evidence reveals that Farr specifically rejected Reed's suggestion to increase Farr's 
inventory coverage. Dexter Farr Deposition at 102-103. A blanket request for adequate 
coverage and a specific rejection of increased spoilage coverage is inadequate to establish 
any contract pr commitment on the part of Reed to unilaterally procure an insurancepplicy 
for Farr that contained coverage beyond their specifications. Thus, based upon the 
undisputed facts^thereis ri6 f$/idence to support a claim for breach oj contract orbaGtf|itl 
sinoe^Refed p§tf#mM bfS agrf§rn&nt with Fajf an i^ obtained a policy of in%ur|[frj|3 
coverage was in place was undisputedly true, a policy was in place prior to the accident. 
Second, the Farr's failure to educate themselves as to the terms of their coverage does not 
amount to reasonable reliance. Absent any evidence supporting claims of 
misrepresentation or reasonable reliance, Farr's estoppel claim fails. 
Finally, as to the cause of action for negligence, Reed clearly had a duty to obtain 
insurance coverage consistent with the Farr's expressed request Contrary to plaintiffs 
assertion, there was no breach of this duty since Reed, absent any specific instruction from 
Farr, obtained coverage consistent with the Farr's prior policy with Unitirin. There is no 
duty between Reed and Farr that requires Reed to insist on procuring a coverage limit 
greater than that which Farr requested. Additionally, with respect to plaintiffs argument 
that Reed had a duty to communicate the "coverage gap" to Farr, the record indicates that 
Reed did so when he suggested additional coverage. Dexter Farr Deposition at 102-103. 
The fact that plaintiff now claims it did not understand the differences in policy coverage 
does not negate the fact that Reed did communicate the idea of additional coverage. 
Nothing in the record supports Farr's argument that Reed misrepresented the st^te of 
coverage and the undi luted facts dpmpnstrate.there was no failure on the partpf Farr to 
perform his duties as plaintiff's insurance agent. Acp^fiplirigiy, Fair's claim for rie 
Trustco, by and through Troy Granger, placed Farr's coverage with American States; the 
policy in place at the time of the ammonia accident. 
Limiting the allegations against Trustco to those contained in the Third Amended 
Complaint, all causes of action against Trustco stem from "Reed's Commitment"-the claim 
that Andrew Reed, while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for Trustco, represented that 
Trustco bound coverage for all of Farr's products and insurable risks. Third Amended 
Complaint, at If 21. 
Similar to the other defendants, the Court concludes there is no evidence of an 
agency relationship between Reed and Trustco. In Utah, to be an agent a person "must 
be authorized by another to 'acton his behalf and subject to his control'" Gildea v Guardian 
Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998 )(c/f/ng, Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 1 (1958)). While Farr relies upon Reed's involvement in obtaining a signature 
for Trustco to act as Broker of Record letter and Reed's collection of a premium as 
evidence of an agency relationship, puch evidence actually supports the existence of an 
agency relationship between R§ed and Farr since it is undisputed that all information 
regarding Farr's insuranpe needs w@re communicated to Trustco by Reed. 
.As to plaintiffs' .pontrap^bagpc^cLaiiris, thg evidencfe reflects that Trustco fulfilled all 
QJ thg ferms of i t s ^ § g j ^ ^ broker of fgesrd arid U" 
For these reasons, Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment against 
Trustco is denied, and defendant Trustco's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
III. Conclusion 
In conclusion, plaintiff is unable to support its allegations against the defendants as 
stated in Farr's Third Amended Complaint. The absence of an agency relationship 
between Andrew Reed and the primary defendants negates the effect of any 
representations Reed allegedly made on the insurers' behalf. Moreover, as to Andrew 
Reed himself, the record indicates his suggestions to alter coverage from that established 
under Farr's prior policy was rejected and Reed has no duty to obtain coverage beyond 
that requested from the insured. 
This Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court, granting and denying the motions 
as set forth herein, and no order is required to be prepared by counsel. 
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